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INTRODUCTION
As proposals for federal climate change legislation proliferate, national
policymakers are focused on a cap-and-trade program for controlling
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. I argue that successfully reducing
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions will require reductions in energy consumption, and that a trading system’s market signals will be insufficient to
prompt the widespread transformations in land use and building efficiency
necessary to reduce energy demand.
Nor will federal action alone suffice. Familiar federalism principles
suggest why cities and regional entities present distinct institutional advantages in addressing consumption given the key role of local land use and
“green” building strategies in reducing demand. Notwithstanding many
cities’ active endorsement of ambitious climate change goals, most cities
are unlikely to act solely on their own initiative. The challenge for federal
lawmakers is to design a vertically integrated climate change policy that
establishes and coordinates the federal, state, and local role in reducing energy consumption.
Given the interrelatedness of environmental, political, social, and economic factors that are implicated in land use decisions, federal requirements for state and local governments to engage in land use planning to reduce vehicle-miles-travelled (“VMT”) must address the socioeconomic
drivers of land use decisions. Focusing on socioeconomic factors is warranted not only as an instrumental mechanism for increasing the success of
VMT-reducing reforms. As state and local governments open the door to
new metropolitan visions, they create a unique opportunity to achieve regional equity.
Part I of this Article highlights the nation’s high level of energy consumption and argues that policies directed solely at tailpipes and smokestacks will fail to reach climate change goals. High emissions are a consequence of high demand, and policies to reduce demand, like green building
requirements and land use reforms that reduce VMT, will be necessary to
reach emission reduction goals.
Part II of this Article observes that recently proposed federal legislation
does not sufficiently address consumption. While many of the federal bills
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propose market mechanisms that are likely to generate price signals that
could incentivize less sprawling growth and greener buildings, Part II identifies numerous obstacles to generating sufficient change through the market alone.
Part III argues that direct local land use and green building measures can
and should play a critical role in reducing demand. Based on federalism
principles, Part III provides an institutional justification for encouraging local and regional engagement in reducing consumption. Part III also highlights the ambitious climate change goals already established in hundreds
of communities throughout the United States.
Part IV recognizes that, notwithstanding the institutional and practical
arguments in favor of local initiatives, significant barriers could slow their
adoption and implementation. Climate change presents classic collective
action impediments. Moreover, land use measures like infill and compact
development provisions are likely to encounter a thicket of political and social resistance. Some federal and state policies also impede—or create disincentives for—smart growth and green building objectives.
Part V argues that federal legislation could overcome obstacles to local
action by adopting a vertically integrated approach. It proposes that the
federal government assign emission reduction obligations to the states and
then require the states to delegate emission reduction responsibilities to the
regional or local level. This Article notes a number of difficult issues that
such legislation would have to resolve, including the extent to which states
should delegate responsibility to the local level, whether the responsibility
should be delegated to the regional or the local level, and the extent to
which the federal legislation should mandate program parameters or leave
implementation to state or local discretion.
Part VI argues that land use policy reforms will not succeed unless we
confront the underlying social, economic, and political causes of existing
sprawl. Integrating socioeconomic considerations is critical not only to reducing VMT, but to enlightened decisionmaking. Principles of sustainable
development suggest that, whenever key decisions impacting fundamental
institutions are made, decisionmakers should integrate the critical environmental, economic, and social dimensions that their reforms necessarily implicate.
I. BEYOND SYMPTOMS: ADDRESSING CONSUMPTION
The politics of climate change regulation would certainly be easier if
measures to address climate change could stop with industry.1 Given the
1. This is not to say that the politics of regulating industry are easy.
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carbon intensity of U.S. consumption, however, the United States is
unlikely to be able to overcome its carbon addiction without measures that
impact how and where we live, build, and consume.2 The role of consumption in causing environmental impacts is not new, but national, state, and
local approaches to air pollution historically have centered on direct emissions by regulating stationary sources and establishing automobile manufacturing requirements.3 The politics of addressing underlying community
structures and individual lifestyles were simply too precarious.4 Now,
however, the public’s increasing recognition of the global peril posed by
climate change could shift the political landscape and increase the political
feasibility of consumption-reducing policies.
At almost twenty metric tons per capita of carbon dioxide per year,5 U.S.
citizens have among the highest per capita GHG emissions in the world.6
2. See John Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10006-07
(2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007) (arguing that climate change measures should facilitate the
creation of climate-protection norms that would in turn motivate individuals to reduce their
climate impact).
3. See Sudhir Chella Rajan, Climate Change Dilemma: Technology, Social Change, or
Both? An Examination of Long-Term Transport Policy Choices in the United States, 34
ENERGY POL’Y 664, 674 (2006) (observing the history of a “technocratic” technology-based
approach to controlling automobile emissions); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 2,
at 1688 (observing that most pollution control efforts have focused on industrial sources).
4. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10004 (observing reluctance to regulate energy efficiency and conservation due to its association with fundamental lifestyle choices and fears
of hardship).
5. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Table H.1co2, World per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005 (Dec. 8, 2008),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls [hereinafter Carbon Emissions Table] (listing 2006 U.S. carbon dioxide emissions of 19.78 metric tons per capita).
6. In comparison, the world average in 2006 was 4.48 metric tons of carbon dioxide
per capita. Id. U.S. citizens are ultimately responsible for an even higher level of per capita
emissions, since the per capita statistics address domestically-generated emissions, not the
emissions associated with imported products. The U.S. trade deficit for goods was 74.9 billion as of July 2008, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES HIGHLIGHTS (2008), http://www.census.gov/
indicator/www/ustrade.html, revealing that U.S. consumption of imported goods is responsible for production and transportation-related emissions in other nations. A study evaluating the GHG emissions associated with goods imported into the United States from China
concluded that, in 2003, U.S. carbon dioxide emissions would have been 6% higher if the
United States had produced the items it imported from China, while Chinese emissions
would have been 14% lower had it not produced goods for the U.S. market. UNIV. CORP.
FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, TRADE IMBALANCE SHIFTS U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS TO CHINA,
BOOSTS GLOBAL TOTAL (2005), http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2005/china. shtml.
Canada and Australia are the only other major industrialized nations with per capita emissions like those of the United States. Canada’s emissions in 2006 were 18.81 metric tons
per capita, and Australia’s were 20.58. The only countries with higher emissions are several
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Other major industrialized nations in Western Europe and Asia have per
capita emissions that hover around ten metric tons per capita of carbon dioxide per year,7 or about half the level of U.S. per capita emissions. While
country-specific factors no doubt impose constraints, these numbers suggest that it is possible to reduce per capita emissions without a drastic reduction in the standard of living.
To reduce per capita emissions, and particularly to reduce emissions
from certain sectors, climate change policy must address not only direct
emissions, but also the consumer demand that drives them.8 In other
words, climate change policy must address causes as well as symptoms.9
Although GHG emissions are impacted by virtually every facet of industrial society, this Article focuses on the land use and building sectors because of their significant GHG contributions and the critical role of local
governments in addressing them.10
small oil-producing nations (Bahrain at 38.44 per capita, Qatar at 61.19 per capita, and
United Arab Emirates at 35.05 per capita), as well as a number of small-island states that
most likely experience high levels of travel (Netherlands Antilles at 49.13 per capita and
U.S. Virgin Islands at 118.30 per capita). Carbon Emissions Table, supra note 5.
7. Carbon Emissions Table, supra note 5. Measured in metric tons, in western Europe,
Austria’s 2005 per capita emissions were 9.55, Belgium’s were 13.10, Denmark’s were
9.38, France’s were 6.59, Germany’s were 10.24, Greece’s were 9.67, Italy’s were 8.03, the
Netherlands’ were 16.44, Norway’s were 11.40, Spain’s were 9.60, Sweden’s were 6.53,
Switzerland’s were 6.13, and the United Kingdom’s were 9.55. In Asia, Japan’s 2005 per
capita emissions were 9.65 and South Korea’s were 10.27. Id. It is worth noting, in comparison, that China’s 2005 per capita emissions were 4.07, a fifth of those of U.S. citizens,
and India’s were 1.07, 5% of the U.S. per capita emissions. Id.
8. See JOHN HOLTZCLAW, 2004 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN
BUILDINGS, A VISION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2 (2004) (“Utility energy efficiency targets,
appliance and vehicle standards, building codes, and land use planning inducements should
all be among the basic elements of any federal climate bill.”); Dernbach, supra note 2, at
10006 (stating that encouraging energy efficiency and conservation addresses “the core
problem” of consumption).
9. Michael Vandenbergh and Anne Steinemann observe that “[t]he framing of pollution sources exerts a powerful influence on the regulatory and social forces brought to bear
on them.” Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1688. If industry, utilities, and vehicles are viewed as the “source” of emissions, then regulatory efforts focus on facility and
vehicle emission-reduction technology or alternatives. Id. In contrast, if individuals themselves are viewed as significant emitters due to their consumption patterns, then regulatory
strategies are more likely to focus on how to reduce consumption and increase individual
energy efficiency, rather than focusing exclusively on large sources. Id.
10. Professors Vandenbergh and Steinemann focus on individual behavior itself as a
mechanism for reducing consumption. See id. Professor Dernbach similarly observes the
important role of individual decisions in determining consumption: individuals decide how
much to drive, how much to buy and use energy-consuming appliances, the size of their
homes, and the degree to which they heat and cool them. See John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15, 21-23, 25-27 (2007) [hereinafter Dernbach, Overcoming the
Behavioral Impetus] (describing appliance use, consumption challenges in buildings, and
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Land Use and Transportation

As of 2005, transportation-related emissions contributed one-third of the
nation’s carbon emissions.11 Over half of the transportation-related emissions result from personal trips, 30% by automobiles and 27% by light
trucks (including sports utility vehicles).12 Reducing emissions per vehicle
is a key strategy for reducing transportation-related emissions,13 but reductions in individual vehicle emissions will not sufficiently reduce net transportation emissions if Americans maintain or increase their VMT.14
vehicle choices and use); see also John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior to
Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107 (2008) [hereinafter
Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior] (discussing the importance of policies to encourage reductions in individual consumption). While their proposals insightfully recognize
the critical role of individual consumption decisions, my focus in this article is on creating
the infrastructure that would enable individuals to consume less, rather than on the individual choices themselves. As Vandenbergh and Steinemann observe, existing urban infrastructures and consumer markets do not always allow individuals to exercise climate protection norms: individuals may live too far from work or transit to easily reduce vehicle use, or
they may not have adequate information or options to purchase energy-efficient homes or
appliances. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1716.
11. MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SHRINKING THE CARBON FOOTPRINT
OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 8 (2008).
12. Id. Another 20% consists of truck traffic. The remaining transportation emission
sources include air, rail, water, and bus transit. Id.
13. Vehicle emissions of GHGs could be reduced in two ways: increasing fuel economy
and decreasing the carbon content of automobile fuels. See REID EWING ET AL., URBAN
LAND INST., GROWING COOLER: THE EVIDENCE ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 2 (2008).
Title I of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 increased vehicle efficiency
standards, an increase likely to indirectly reduce carbon emissions. See Pub. L. No. 110140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007). In 2002, California passed legislation to directly control vehicle
GHG emissions. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2006). At least eleven
other states have stated that they would adopt California’s standards, and six additional
states have expressed interest in doing so. See AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
FACT SHEET ON CLIMATE CHANGE EMISSION CONTROL REGULATIONS 3, http://www.arb.ca.
gov/cc/factsheets/cc_newfs.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). Although the EPA did not allow
California to move forward with its standards, see Zachary Coile et al., EPA Blocks California Bid to Limit Greenhouse Gases from Cars, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2007, at A1, it is possible that the Obama administration would allow California’s standards to be implemented.
Title II of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 calls for increasing the use
of biofuels. The potential for biofuels to reduce net GHG emissions depends upon the feedstock, with some biofuels predicted to reduce net GHG emissions (for example, cellulosic
ethanol) while others are predicted to generate little if any reductions (such as corn ethanol).
See BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FUEL ETHANOL: BACKGROUND AND
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 16-17 (2007). California has adopted a low-carbon fuel standard
specifically intended to reduce net carbon emissions. See Exec. Order No. s-01-07 (Jan. 18,
2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/print-version/executive-order/5172/.
14. The nation’s earlier effort to control traditional air pollutants provides a case in
point. The 1970 Clean Air Act required automakers to reduce certain traditional pollutant
emissions by 90%, see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(a)(A), a requirement that was met in the early
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VMT is heavily influenced by underlying land use patterns and transportation infrastructure. U.S. land use patterns are characterized by lowdensity sprawling development.15 With the outward expansion of lowdensity suburbs and exurbs throughout the twentieth century, U.S. residents
began to drive increasing distances as the circumference of metropolitan
areas grew.16 The U.S. pattern of low-density residential growth has been
heavily car-dependent, resulting in sharply increasing levels of VMT and
associated vehicular emissions.17 From 1969 until 1990, VMT increased
by 82% while the U.S. population increased by only 21%.18 From 1970
until 2005, average household VMT increased from 16,400 miles to
24,300, even though average household size fell.19
Although concerns about the environmental and social consequences of
sprawl have launched a “smart growth” movement over the last twenty
years,20 the U.S. pattern of expanding sprawl and increasing VMT has not
dramatically abated. For example, from 1990 until 1997, housing stock in
low-density metropolitan counties increased at a faster rate (15%) than in
high-density urban cores (5%).21 A recent study of land use and climate
notes that “[t]he U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts a 48 percent increase in driving between 2005 and
2030 . . . outpacing the projected 23 percent increase in population.”22
As a consequence of continuing sprawl, transportation-related emissions
are not expected to decrease notwithstanding recent federal legislation to
1980s. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 566 (5th ed. 2006). Notwithstanding that laudable success, overall emissions
did not significantly change since individual vehicle emission reductions were largely offset
by large increases in VMT. Id. at 562.
15. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 2-3, 21. “Sprawl” is a complex phenomenon
that is not reducible to any single variable. Key attributes of sprawl include low density,
separation of uses, lack of concentrated employment, residential, or other activity centers,
and large block size with poor access. See id. at 60.
16. See id. at 21; Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management, and Sustainable Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26, 31-32 (2003).
17. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 31-33.
18. Id. at 32 (citing PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS 47 (Chris
Dresser & Doug Foster eds., 1993)); see also EWING, ET AL., supra note 13, at 21 (noting
that VMT has grown three times faster than population).
19. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
20. See Patricia Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can We Do? Progress Toward Sustainable Land Use in the United States, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 787, 788-90
(2007).
21. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 30. A complex set of legal, political, economic, and social
factors have contributed to the nation’s sprawl. Insightful descriptions of these factors can
be found in Ziegler, supra note 16, at 32-36.
22. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 43.
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improve fuel efficiency and increase the use of biofuels. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007’s fuel efficiency standards are expected
to increase fleet-wide fuel economy by 34% by 2030,23 and its biofuel requirements are expected to reduce lifecycle GHG emissions by 10% by
2025.24 Although the combination of these measures would decrease net
vehicular GHG emissions from cars and light trucks by 23% by 2030 if
VMT levels stayed constant,25 projected increases in VMT will result in little net decrease in emissions.26 Thus, while fuel efficiency measures may
prevent increases in net transportation emissions, they will not reduce
emissions overall unless VMT is simultaneously controlled.27
There is little question that existing VMT is correlated with the degree of
sprawl. Numerous studies of metropolitan areas indicate that households in
areas with greater residential density, greater employment density, mixed
land uses, and good access to public transit have lower VMT.28 In a recent
study of the carbon footprints of the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas, Professor Marilyn Brown and her colleagues observed that metropolitan areas with high density development patterns and rail transit tended to
have lower carbon emissions than other cities.29
While the correlations are not without controversy, changing future land
use patterns is likely to lead to future reductions in VMT and its associated

23. See id. at 3, 43.
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4, 44. The study projects that by 2030, net emissions will have remained virtually constant at 2005 levels due to increases in VMT.
27. See id. at 2, 4 (stating that “technological improvements in vehicles and fuels are
likely to be offset by continuing, robust growth in VMT” and that “the United States cannot
achieve . . . large reductions in transportation-related CO2 emissions without sharply reducing the growth in the number of miles driven”). Ewing and his co-authors assume that,
overall, the transportation sector would have to reduce emissions by 33% to achieve climate
stabilization goals. Id. at 114.
28. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 12 (citing HOLTZCLAW, supra note 8); MARY JEAN
BÜRER ET AL., LOCATION EFFICIENCY AS THE MISSING PIECE OF THE ENERGY PUZZLE: HOW
SMART GROWTH CAN UNLOCK TRILLION DOLLAR CONSUMER COST SAVINGS (2004), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/air/files/air_06031001a.pdf; EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 6
(describing studies showing reduced VMT in more compact cities); id. at 55-56; EDWARD L.
GLAESER & MATTHEW KAHN, POLICY BRIEF: THE GREENNESS OF CITIES (2008), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/rappaport/downloads/policybriefs/greencities_final.pdf (summarizing preliminary results of a nationwide study analyzing energy use in metropolitan areas).
29. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 22-25. Residential density and access to rail transit
are, of course, not the only factors relevant to a municipality’s total carbon footprint. The
Brown study observed that a region’s weather, its fuel mix, and fuel prices were also highly
relevant. Id. at 25-26; see also GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28 (evaluating a variety of
factors affecting a metropolitan area’s greenhouse gas emissions).
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carbon emissions. In theory, land use reforms that require localities to
eliminate their sprawl-inducing zoning codes and provide appropriate incentives could lead to increased density, infill development, mixed uses
that lessen the distance between work, home, shopping, and other activities,
improved access among important travel points, and neighborhood designs
that facilitate access to public transit, walking, and bicycle use. Advocates
hope that such changes would both reduce the extent of automobile use (by
shortening distances and decreasing frequency) and change travel mode by
leading more people to use public transit, bike, or walk instead of driving.
Professor Reid Ewing and his co-authors have identified six critical factors for determining the impact of land use changes on future carbon dioxide emissions from the transportation sector: (1) compact development’s
market share, relative to more sprawling development; (2) the extent to
which compact development reduces per capita VMT; (3) the level of compact new development relative to the existing base of more sprawling development; (4) the degree of urbanization, since compact development
primarily affects urban VMT; (5) the extent to which reductions in VMT
are correlated with reductions in carbon emissions; and (6) the proportion
of motor vehicle travel within overall transportation emissions, since land
use changes would not affect rail, ship, or airline emissions.30
Based on the foregoing factors, Ewing and his co-authors predict that increasing compact development relative to sprawl would reduce VMT by
10% to 14% and reduce the U.S. transportation sector’s carbon dioxide
emissions by 7% to 10% by 2050.31 They reach this conclusion by assuming, under the first factor, that 60% to 90% of new development will be
compact.32 Under the second factor, they assume that compact development could reduce per capita VMT by 20% to 40%, with the variation depending upon its design.33 Key variables would be the development’s density, diversity of uses, urban design, destination accessibility, and distance
to transit.34 For the analysis, the authors assume that the average per capita
30. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 32.
31. Id. at 35. Other studies suggest a more dramatic impact on GHG emission reductions, projecting that increased density could lead to a 10% reduction below 2001 emissions
within ten years. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 12.
32. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 32-33. Professor Ewing and his colleagues suggest
that land use will follow market demand. However, existing zoning provisions interfere
with the market’s ability to respond to demand because they mandate low density and separate land uses. See generally JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND
CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 23 (2006) (arguing that existing zoning impedes market demand for denser development). Existing zoning restrictions
would have to be modified to enable the degree of compact development they propose.
33. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 33.
34. Id.
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VMT reduction would be 30%.35 Under the third factor, the authors note
that the existing housing and commercial building stock is likely to be extensively expanded and replaced by 2050.36 They assume that, by 2050,
66% of the built environment will be new or rebuilt.37 Under the fourth
factor, they assume that the percentage of VMT generated from urban
(rather than rural) sources will grow from the current 66% to 80%, given
the increasing trend toward urbanization.38 Under the fifth factor, they
predict that the VMT associated with compact development could lead to
slightly higher carbon emissions per mile travelled because city driving
generates greater emissions per mile than long-distance driving.39 The authors therefore assume that, for every reduction in VMT, carbon dioxide
emissions will be reduced by only 90%.40 Finally, under the sixth factor,
the study authors assume that the proportion of travel associated with motor
vehicles (rather than air, ships, and trains) will increase slightly from 79%
in 2005 to 80% by 2050.41
While there is little controversy over the connection between existing
urban form and high levels of VMT, some have questioned whether future
land use changes would, in fact, reduce VMT.42 If anti-sprawl land use reforms do not lead to decreases in VMT—if the American public proves
wedded to its automobiles and long distance travel regardless of urban
form—then land use reforms, whatever their intrinsic merit, would not be
justified by climate benefits.43
35. Id.
36. Id. at 33-34. In the housing sector, Ewing and his co-authors predict that more than
70% of the 2005 housing stock will be new or replaced by 2050. Id. at 33. In the nonresidential sector, Ewing and his co-authors predict that, by 2050, sixty billion square feet will
be added to the existing 100 billion square feet and that 130 billion square feet will be rebuilt. Id. at 34. Some of the new construction will also be rebuilt before 2050. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 34.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 45-46, 56, 81 (observing that vehicle trip frequencies could increase emissions per mile due to the additional emissions resulting from cold starts and that vehicles
tend to emit more per mile at speeds below forty-five miles per hour).
40. Id. at 34-35. The emissions reduction benefits of VMT reduction clearly outweigh
the slight increase in emissions resulting from density-induced congestion. See id. at 56, 81.
41. Id. at 35.
42. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 23. As one study has stated: “It is one thing to say
that cities of different urban form have different patterns of energy consumption and a quite
different thing to assume that realistic policies can turn an inefficient city into an efficient
one.” ELENA SAFIROVA ET AL., SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 8
(2007).
43. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 31. Given their skepticism that land use policies could reduce VMT, Safirova and her colleagues conclude that “[p]olicies with the main
goal of reducing energy consumption should be national, not local . . . [and that local governments should] leave the energy policy to federal and international entities.” Id.
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The greatest controversy centers on Ewing’s second factor: the extent to
which smart growth measures such as increased density, mixed uses, planning to enhance accessibility, and neighborhood design would, in fact, reduce VMT. Many theoretical studies have evaluated this question, with
some studies suggesting that greater density would lead to significant VMT
reductions and others finding much more modest reductions.44 Similarly,
assessments of the impact of neighborhood design on VMT have had
mixed results.45
The studies that find little link between land use reforms and VMT reductions appear to paint an inaccurately pessimistic picture. They generally isolate the impact of individual factors, like density or neighborhood
design, without considering the multiple characteristics necessary for compact development to reduce VMT successfully.46 Professors Badoe and
Miller have stated that studies that focus solely on density or neighborhood
design “tend[] to ignore the critical question of connectivity: it is of little
use having a dense neighborhood which does not have good access to relevant activity destinations.”47 Professor Bartholomew, in this colloquium
volume, makes clear that accessibility is essential to reducing VMT.48 As
Professor Ewing and his colleagues suggest, a development’s density, diversity of uses, destination accessibility, and distance to transit are all critical factors in reducing VMT.49 Considering each factor in isolation is

44. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 3-4; Daniel A. Badoe & Eric J. Miller,
Transportation-Land-Use Interaction: Empirical Findings in North America, and Their
Implications for Modeling, 5 TRANSP. RES. PART D 235, 248 (2000). Professor Ewing suggests that while the data are somewhat mixed, most studies find that changes in land use will
lead to VMT reductions. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 65, 71. He suggests that the key
issues are not whether the reductions will occur, but how and to what extent. Id. at 65.
45. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 252.
46. See id. at 251-52. For example, a study attempting to project the VMT impact of
increasing density through infill in the D.C. metropolitan area focused on several policy options for reducing VMT, but generally considered only one or two variables at a time. They
found that increasing density, or increasing density through a program designed to bring
workers closer to their jobs, decreased trip distances, but had little, if any, net impact on
VMT due to increasing trip frequencies. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 16-26.
However, the study did not consider land use changes that might have reduced trip frequencies, such as allowing mixed uses, or changes in public transportation that might have facilitated mode switching. It may have thus underestimated the potential long-term VMT impacts of more comprehensive policy approaches.
47. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 251-52.
48. See Keith Bartholomew, Cities and Accessibility: The Potential for Carbon Reduction and the Need for National Leadership, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159, 163-64 (2009).
49. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 67-71; Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 174-82;
supra note 28 and accompanying text. Badoe & Miller note that transit supply is also a
critical factor in encouraging drivers’ mode shift to public transit, but one that has rarely
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likely to underestimate the reduction potential of a more integrated approach.50
Critics of the land use-VMT connection also contend that early studies
predicting that land use reforms would reduce VMT failed to consider the
role of socioeconomic or demographic factors in predicting potential VMT
reductions.51 Higher-income residents living in dense neighborhoods
might continue to drive, notwithstanding convenient public transportation.52 Even if they live in dense neighborhoods, such residents are likely
to continue to take advantage of the widely-dispersed amenities available in
large metropolitan areas.53 Professor Ewing and his colleagues have found
that trip frequencies and mode choices probably are influenced by socioeconomic variables.54 Trip length, however, is less determined by socioeconomic influences,55 and, although mode choices are influenced by socioeconomics, non-automobile choices were more likely with higher
densities and mixed uses.56 Overall, their report concludes that recent studies that have controlled for “confounding influences” like socioeconomic
status “still found strong relationships between urban form and VMT.”57
Another critique of the studies showing a connection between land use
and VMT is that they suffer from “self-selection” bias: they fail to prove
that urban form itself, rather than preexisting preferences to reduce automobile use, lead to reductions in VMT.58 In response, Professor Ewing argues that studies controlling for preexisting “bias” find VMT reductions
regardless of individual preferences.59 Moreover, Professors Ewing and

been considered in the land use-transportation studies to date. Badoe & Miller, supra note
44, at 254.
50. Based on an exhaustive review of the land-use-transportation literature, Professors
Badoe and Miller argue that studies evaluating the impact of land use changes on VMT
would be more accurate if they integrated the relevant components of land use reforms
rather than considering each separately. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 260-61.
51. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 5.
52. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 254 (reporting that socioeconomic factors,
including income, age, gender, and occupation have an impact on travel behavior and residents’ likely responses to increasing density).
53. Moreover, even if greater density and mixed uses were promoted, it is often difficult
for both wage earners in a two-earner family to live close to their work when they reside in
large metropolitan regions. See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 72 (1999).
54. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 68.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 68-69.
57. Id. at 57; see also id. at 61 (describing a study showing that sprawl was a more significant predictor of VMT than other socio-demographic variables).
58. See id. at 91-94 (describing this critique).
59. Id. at 94.
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Levine suggest that, even if self-selection does make a difference to the
overall impact of urban form on behavior, considering automobilereduction preferences could make studies more, not less, predictive of
likely VMT changes.60 If land use reforms create additional compact development that was formerly undersupplied by the market, then people
seeking less automobile-dependent lifestyles are likely to gravitate toward
such communities and reduce automobile use accordingly.61 Controlling
for their pre-existing propensity to reduce automobile use would underestimate the importance of the land use changes that make it possible for
them to realize their preferences.62
Despite the complexity of determining the likely impact of land use
changes on VMT, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that land use
changes, if made in a comprehensive fashion with attention to the myriad
factors impacting driving choices, could lead to significant VMT reductions. While it is true that those who can afford to do so may continue driving more than smart growth advocates hope, integrated planning, selfselection, and increasing awareness of the value of personal energy decisions may lead to greater reductions than skeptics predict.
Additional uncertainties surround Professor Ewing’s carbon reduction
predictions. For example, his prediction that, with appropriate land use reforms, 60% to 90% of new development will be compact could be optimistic.63 He is undoubtedly correct that compact development will increase if
obstacles to its development are removed, since there is strong evidence
that compact development is currently undersupplied relative to market
demand.64 Nonetheless, it is not clear that the level of demand will support

60. See id. at 95-96; LEVINE, supra note 32, at 30-36.
61. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 96 (observing that if compact development is
currently undersupplied, as they argue it is, new development will attract those who want to
reduce automobile use and lead to higher-than-anticipated reductions in VMT). Badoe &
Miller state that “[i]ncreased residential density does not directly ‘cause’ reductions in auto
VMT. Rather, under the right circumstances, it might attract a resident population with particular socioeconomic characteristics.” Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 252-53. The authors contend that residents with certain “desired activity patterns” will make decisions that
reduce VMT by more than they would have in a more sprawling urban form. Id.
62. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 36 (“If the land-use effect works largely via selfselection, then a search for a residual pure effect would underestimate the potential impact
of land use policy reform.”).
63. Even if restrictions on compact development, like minimum density requirements,
are removed, the government may be limited in its ability to induce developers to actually
build denser, mixed-use communities. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 19, 109-10.
64. See id. at 127-28 (reporting that most developers believe there is an inadequate supply of “alternative development” options relative to demand, and that local regulations are
the primary obstacle to alternative development); see also EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at
94, 96 (noting that many Atlanta residents would prefer but were unable to find walkable
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as high a ratio of compact to sprawling development as he and his colleagues predict,65 or that the many challenges facing infill development
will be overcome.
Another uncertainty is the future ratio between new and existing development. If there is little new development, then existing sprawl will
largely determine future VMT even if most new development is compact.
New compact development will impact VMT only if and when it constitutes a significant percentage of the building stock. If there is less turnover
in the existing housing and commercial stock by 2050 than Ewing and his
colleagues predict,66 then land use reforms will have a smaller impact on
transportation emissions than they predict.
Ultimately, however, whatever the uncertainties about the extent to
which land use reforms would reduce VMT, it is clear that failing to reform
land use and tolerating continued sprawl is fundamentally unsustainable.67
While such reforms may not achieve as great a carbon reduction as Professor Ewing and his colleagues predict, not enacting the necessary reforms
would inevitably result in higher VMT, and carbon emissions, than more
compact and accessible development. Land use reforms are one strategy
among many,68 and are an important component of a broader strategy to
reduce the transportation sector’s emissions even if their relative contribution is somewhat uncertain.
B.

Buildings and Energy Consumption

Existing air pollution policies and prospective climate change legislation
focus on power plants, the source of 41% of the nation’s carbon dioxide

neighborhoods and stating that there is “ample evidence” that current demand for “walkable,
transit-oriented environments far exceeds the current supply”).
65. Some scholars suggest that existing sprawl represents U.S. citizens’ enduring preference for low-density suburban life, a preference that would remain unchanged even if denser
development were permitted. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 65-66 (describing surveys of
citizen preferences for low-density suburban housing).
66. Conceivably, stricter building standards for new buildings could slow the turnover
of the building stock. However, efficiency requirements on existing buildings would remove that disparity.
67. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 3, 5-6, 48-49 (stating that uncertainty is inevitable, but
does not provide a reason for reducing existing barriers to compact development).
68. Ewing and his colleagues make clear that land use policies alone will not “solve” the
problem of climate change or the transportation sector’s contribution to it. See EWING ET
AL., supra note 13, at 114. They note that investments in public transportation, changing
highway funding priorities, and market mechanisms to reduce driving could contribute to
additional reductions from the transportation sector. Id. at 115.
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emissions in 2006.69 Undoubtedly, important gains can and must be
achieved by direct utility emissions programs that promote a transition to
renewable and less-polluting sources of energy. However, the electricity
sector is unlikely to yield sufficient emission reductions without reducing
consumer demand.70 Buildings are a central component of that demand.
Residential and commercial buildings consume 72% of U.S. electricity.71
In addition, buildings generate direct emissions through natural gas and
fuel oil consumption.72 Increased energy efficiency in new buildings, existing buildings, and appliances could have a significant impact on the nation’s electricity demand and its associated emissions, and is the lowestcost mechanism available for reducing the electricity sector’s emissions.73
Improving energy efficiency and alternative energy measures in new
buildings could significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the carbon footprint
for new construction. In California, for example, the Public Utilities
Commission and Energy Commission have set a goal of zero net energy
use for residential buildings by 2020 and for commercial buildings by
2030.74 Key players in urban architecture, like the American Institute of
Architects and the U.S. Mayors’ Conference, have similarly called for car-

69. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
SINKS: 1990-2006 ES-8 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
emissions/downloads/08_ES.pdf.
70. Some might argue that demand does not need to be addressed because: (1) we could
switch to carbonless nuclear power; or (2) we could develop carbon capture and sequestration (“CCS”) technologies that eliminate the need to reduce carbon. Due to the environmental concerns presented by both of these options, I assume for purposes of this paper that
they do not present viable alternatives to demand reduction. In addition, increasing energy
efficiency is likely to be a much more certain and much less expensive approach than developing carbon capture and sequestration and nuclear power, suggesting that it should be pursued even if research and development of CCS and nuclear power continues. See
MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH AT WHAT
COST? 60-62 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/
greenhousegas.asp [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT] (discussing the costs and uncertainties
associated with CCS and nuclear power).
71. See Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster Green Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (2008) (citing
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK §§ 1.1.3, 1.1.6).
72. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, at ES-8.
73. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xiv, 34 (stating that improving the energy
efficiency of buildings and appliances could significantly reduce projected GHG emissions);
id. at 28 (“[i]ncreased energy efficiency could reduce power load by some 24 percent”).
The McKinsey Report also observes that, on a lifecycle basis, achieving energy efficiency
has negative costs. Id. at 34, 69.
74. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA LONG TERM ENERGY EFFICIENCY STRATEGIC
PLAN: ACHIEVING MAXIMUM ENERGY SAVINGS IN CALIFORNIA FOR 2009 AND BEYOND 9, 30
(2008) [hereinafter CPUC PLAN].
AND
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bon-neutral buildings by 2030.75 Even some within the building industry,
an industry traditionally skeptical of environmental mandates, have embraced dramatic energy-use reduction goals for new construction.76
The impact of these goals depends, in part, upon the extent to which the
future built environment consists of new (green) versus existing (less
green) buildings. Current estimates project significant increases in new and
retrofitted buildings. The McKinsey Report, a comprehensive assessment
of GHG abatement strategies, projects that by 2030, the commercial building stock will grow from seventy-three billion to 108 billion square feet,
and residential homes will grow from 113 million homes to 147 million, a
30% increase.77
Notwithstanding the likely significance of more energy-efficient new
construction, the existing building stock will remain an important component of energy demand, with seventy-six million residential and five million commercial buildings.78 Increasing energy efficiency in existing
buildings could substantially reduce demand.79 According to some studies,
the majority of existing residences and commercial buildings are poorly insulated and retrofits could significantly increase their efficiency.80 Generating energy-efficiency improvements and renewable energy investments in
existing buildings presents numerous practical and political challenges, but
remains an important step in reducing the nation’s GHG emissions.
Demand-reduction measures in the land use and buildings context could
thus play a key role in reducing the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions.
The next question is: to what extent have federal lawmakers directly or indirectly addressed consumption?
75. See Sussman, supra note 71, at 9.
76. The Home Builders Association of Northern California has supported the adoption
of local building code ordinances for new construction requiring 50% less energy use than
1990 levels by 2020. Press Release, Home Builders Assoc. of N. Cal., Home Builders Association of Northern California Announces Support for Mandatory Green Building Standards in all Bay Area Communities (Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://www.hbanc.org/
files/HBANC_CPUC_0.pdf.
77. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 10, 34, 39; see also EWING ET AL., supra
note 13, at 33-34 (predicting large increase in new and rebuilt residential and nonresidential
building stock by 2050).
78. See Edna Sussman, Building Stock Offers Opportunities to Foster Sustainability and
Provides Tools for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 17, 18 (2007).
79. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10029-30 (discussing studies assessing potential for
energy efficiency improvements). For example, simply improving attic insulation in cold
climates with older housing stock “could improve heating performance by nearly 30 percent” from business as usual. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 39.
80. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10018 (noting that 60% of existing residences and
70% of commercial buildings are inadequately insulated).
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II. THE LIMITS OF EXISTING FEDERAL INITIATIVES
As I have argued elsewhere, federal legislation to address climate
change is essential.81 This Part outlines the nature of federal proposals to
date and the extent to which they directly or indirectly promote the types of
land use and green building initiatives essential to reducing energy demand.
A.

Proposed Federal Legislation

With the onset of a Democratic Congress in January 2007, members of
Congress proposed a flurry of economy-wide climate change bills as well
as more narrowly-tailored legislation with energy and climate change implications.82 Except as relevant, this Article focuses on the economy-wide
legislation.
The proposed climate change bills typically set economy-wide GHG reduction goals over time83 and authorize the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) to develop a regulatory or market mechanism for reaching
the targets. Traditional regulatory measures could include direct stationary
source controls.84 Direct controls are, however, unlikely to promote demand reduction if they are modeled after existing performance standards,
which require emissions reductions per unit of production, rather than requiring reductions in production itself.85 Under a performance standard, a

81. See Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 794-97
(2008) [hereinafter Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism].
82. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 5-6, 11-12 (2007); Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal Is
“Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 123 (2008).
83. See Flatt, supra note 82, at 128-29.
84. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role
for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 76 (2007) [hereinafter
Kaswan, The Domestic Response]. Arguably, the Clean Air Act already provides the EPA
with the authority to create GHG emission standards for new stationary sources, see Holly
Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s
Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 799, 816-30, 832-33 (2008), but the Clean Air Act does not set standards for existing
sources in attainment areas. The Supreme Court clarified the EPA’s authority to set GHG
vehicle emission standards in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
The climate legislation frequently includes additional provisions as well, including research, technology development programs, adaptation provisions, and other climate-change
related programs. See RAMSEUR & YACOBUCCI, supra note 82, at 7-10; Flatt, supra note 82,
at 146-47 (discussing technology research and development programs).
85. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38
ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10300 (2008) [hereinafter Kaswan, Environmental Justice] (describing traditional rate-based emission standards).
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utility could be required to reduce its per-unit carbon dioxide emissions,
but would have no incentive to reduce overall energy production. Without
an incentive to reduce production, it would not have an incentive to reduce
demand.
National policymakers are considering a cap-and-trade system applicable to large emission sources.86 Under a cap-and-trade program, the EPA
would establish steadily decreasing annual emissions caps and distribute or
auction emissions allowances to facilities included in the trading system.
The allowances could be distributed to “upstream” fuel providers, such as
oil or coal companies, based upon the carbon content of fuels, or “downstream” to facilities actually emitting GHGs. As discussed further below,
this type of market mechanism could create indirect demand-reduction incentives.
Not surprisingly, Congress’s approach to the transportation sector has
focused on vehicle efficiency and fuels,87 not federally-mandated land use
changes to reduce VMT. Past federal efforts to shape local land use policies to reduce air pollution generated strong protests from local governments.88 Somewhat greater federal action is evident in the energyefficiency context. The federal government has already passed applianceefficiency legislation and encouraged states to improve their building
codes.89 In particular, the recently-passed Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 addressed energy efficiency in residential, commercial,
and federal buildings to a certain extent.90 Congress does not, however,
appear to be considering a full-fledged energy code to promote energy efficiency. Nonetheless, a national cap-and-trade program or other market

86. See Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior, supra note 10, at 111-14; Flatt, supra note 82, at 135; see also LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION: CAP-AND-TRADE BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS
(2007).
87. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 provisions increasing fuel economy and encouraging the use of
biofuels).
88. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1206 (1995) (describing local government opposition to early federal efforts to
incorporate land use measures into federally-drafted clean air implementation plans).
89. See Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus, supra note 10, at 19-23 (describing federal appliance programs and federal requirements to encourage states to adopt
more energy efficient building codes).
90. See Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 401-441 (2007). One of the more promising climate
change bills, proposed by Senators Lieberman and Warner in the 110th Congress, included a
requirement for states to adopt enhanced building energy efficiency standards. LiebermanWarner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong., §§ 5201-5202 (2008). Sections 5101 to 5102 addressed appliance efficiency standards.
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mechanism could potentially generate indirect demand-reducing mechanisms.
B.

The Limited Role of the Market in Reducing VMT

In theory, a market mechanism could generate VMT reductions through
increases in fuel prices. For example, if a cap-and-trade program required
oil companies to buy allowances based on their fuel’s carbon content, the
price of gasoline could increase. Higher gasoline costs could encourage
drivers to cut down on discretionary trips and induce those who have access to public transit to shift from cars to transit.91 There is some evidence
that recent increases in gasoline prices have had precisely these effects.92
The resulting reductions in VMT are likely to be small, however, unless
and until land use patterns and transportation systems reduce the need for
extensive automobile use.93 Conceivably, in the long term, increased gasoline costs could generate consumer demand for compact development and
public transportation.94 Housing developers could respond by increasing
infill development or creating denser, less distant, communities, thereby
mitigating current trends toward sprawl.
While the market could play an important role in inducing some behavioral shifts, it is unlikely to prompt a sufficiently widespread reconstitution
of metropolitan space. First, given the political unpopularity of increasing
fuel costs,95 relevant government agencies might offset higher energy
prices by reducing gasoline taxes, dulling the incentive effects.96 The un-

91. Cf. Dernbach , supra note 2, at 10023-24 (discussing reductions in VMT that could
result from increasing gasoline taxes).
92. Joelle Tessler, With Gas Prices Soaring, Driving Drops, S.F. CHRON., June 20,
2008, at C3.
93. Gasoline price increases in 2008 reduced gasoline consumption to a limited extent.
See id. Nonetheless, sprawl has increased the inelasticity of gasoline consumption since
many individuals do not have alternatives to extensive automobile use. See Vandenbergh &
Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1716 & n.198. Gasoline price increases from 2001-06 reduced
consumption by only 4%, compared with the 30% reduction that occurred in response to
similar increases from 1975-80. Id.
94. See generally SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42 (concluding that a high tax on VMT
would have a bigger impact on reducing VMT than increasing housing density or other proposals to modify urban form).
95. In the summer of 2008, gasoline prices increased dramatically, creating a political
outcry and calls for government action to lower prices. See Zachary Coile, While Congress
Argues, Gas Costs Keep Climbing, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 2008, at A1 (describing increasing
prices and political pressure for government action).
96. Some of the presidential candidates in 2008 responded to high gas prices in Summer
2008 by calling for reductions in gas taxes. See Jim Abrams, Gas Tax Holiday Hopes Run
over by Fiscal Facts, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 2008, at A7. Political pressure to reduce gasoline taxes could, however, be countered by the highway construction interests who benefit
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equal distributional impacts of increasing gasoline prices could create an
additional justification for slowing price increases, since the poor generally
pay a higher percentage of their income on transportation than average and
would be disproportionately impacted by increasing gasoline prices.97
Second, even if gasoline prices increased, the impact of the price increase could be offset by increasing automobile efficiency. Recently
passed measures to increase fuel efficiency could reduce fuel use per mile
travelled and thus lower consumer costs, dampening the price signal from
increasing fuel costs.98 If consumers’ net fuel costs do not significantly
change, they would have little incentive to change their housing or driving
decisions. While increasing fuel efficiency is critical to reducing transportation emissions, the negative feedback loop between increasing efficiency
and reducing VMT should be recognized.
Third, although increasing fuel costs might theoretically have a marginal
impact on housing location decisions, other factors such as housing costs,
size, quality, neighborhood amenities, and schools are likely to dominate—
particularly for the middle- to upper-income residents who are most likely
to live in outlying suburbs and exurbs.99 Increasing fuel costs are more
likely to induce the purchase of more efficient cars than to change housing
location decisions.
Fourth, and of critical importance, even assuming that price signals create consumer demand for less sprawling development, significant legal and
practical barriers currently prevent or deter developers from building infill
and more compact development.100 Legally, many suburban towns prohibit
from existing taxes. See id. (describing highway construction industry’s opposition to cuts
in gasoline taxes); cf. Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10017, 10023 (noting that increasing gas
taxes to encourage conservation is likely to be a “political nonstarter” and observing political opposition to increasing gasoline prices).
97. For those in the lowest-income quintile, transportation costs can consume 40% of
household income. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 139.
98. For example, California predicted that its new GHG vehicle emission standards
would, by increasing fuel efficiency, result in a net savings to consumers, dampening the
price signal sent by increasing fuel prices. See AIR RES. BD., supra note 13 (describing financial impact of stricter vehicle emission standards); cf. Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10024
(observing that, without an increase in gas prices, more stringent vehicle efficiency standards could lead to increased VMT, offsetting the emission reduction gains achieved by the
fuel standards).
99. In some cases, however, poorer residents are migrating to outlying suburbs in order
to find larger houses at cheaper prices—they drive until they qualify for a mortgage for the
kind of housing they desire. Increasing fuel costs could have a more significant impact on
the locational decisions of poor and middle-class residents.
100. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 9 (“There is a near-universal acknowledgement among
transportation and land-use researchers that municipalities regularly employ their land-use
regulatory powers to exclude denser development.”). According to one study, the existing
market for denser development is already frustrated by local zoning restrictions. Id. at 128.
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multi-family housing, require minimum lot sizes, and require minimum
floor-area ratios that lead to sprawling rather than compact development
and that prevent the higher densities necessary for effective public transit.101 They also prohibit mixed residential and commercial uses, forcing
residents to drive to shop or work.102 Suburbs engage in zoning that effectively excludes affordable housing, forcing lower-paid workers in suburban
commercial centers to commute from poorer areas.103
As a practical matter, increasing consumer demand might not be fully
matched by developer supply in light of the difficulties that infill development could pose for developers. Since infill development has consequences for existing residents, infill development could require a more
complex, expensive, and time-consuming environmental review process
than building in undeveloped areas.104 To the extent that infill development consists of affordable housing, it frequently encounters local resistance.105
Fifth, higher levels of VMT reduction can be achieved only if compact
and infill development lead residents to shift from cars to public transit, a
shift that will occur only if efficient and convenient public transit options
are available.106 While market pressures for more compact housing could
conceivably lead residents to advocate for increased transit through the political process, a cap-and-trade program would, at best, set in motion a long
and uncertain process for achieving desirable investments in public transit.
Although a cap-and-trade program could generate price signals that
might reduce VMT to some extent, the market alone is unlikely to prompt
the necessary local planning and legal reforms. A proactive and coordi-

101. See id. at 11, 53; JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 30 (2001) (describing the constraints imposed by
conventional zoning).
102. See Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth: The Need for Regional
Governments, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1023 (2001).
103. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 81-85.
104. The process is not necessarily more technically difficult, since greenfield development can involve complex environmental issues. It could, however, be more politically difficult and more heavily litigated in light of existing residents’ vested interests.
105. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Sustainable Development in Suburbs and Their
Cities: The Environmental and Financial Imperatives of Racial, Ethnic, and Economic Inclusion, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 99 (1998) (discussing suburban resistance to affordable
housing).
106. See Badoe & Miller, supra note 44, at 254-59 (analyzing impact of transit demand
and supply on automobile use); cf. EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 113-27, 139 (arguing that
the VMT-reducing potential of compact development would be enhanced by greater investment in public transportation—as well as other policy changes—and suggesting that affordable housing should be developed near transit stations).
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nated policy approach to land use and transit would provide a more efficient and effective mechanism for reducing VMT.
C.

The Limited Role of the Market in Increasing Building Efficiency

Unless Congress chooses to require even more rigorous federal building
and appliance standards, the primary mechanism by which the federal climate change bills would affect consumer energy use would be through indirect market pressures. A properly-designed cap-and-trade program
would require utilities to either reduce their emissions directly or pay to
purchase additional allowances. Although the utilities are likely to achieve
some of the reductions through fuel-switching to less carbon-intensive fuels
(for example, by switching from coal to natural gas) and through alternative energy investments (for example, in wind and solar), these options are
expensive and may require years of development.107 Utilities are therefore
likely to adopt energy efficiency as an important component of their emission-reduction strategies,108 and to implement the strategy through consumer demand-reduction programs. In addition, national utility regulation
could increase the price of electricity and natural gas, creating a direct market pressure for consumers to reduce their consumption. Each of these
market-derived mechanisms for reducing demand are considered in turn below.
1.

Utility Demand-Reduction Programs

A utility demand-reduction program could incorporate a wide variety of
strategies.109 To encourage energy efficient construction and retrofits, utilities could create incentives that range from simple rebates for energy efficient appliances110 to innovative financing programs that help consumers

107. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xv (stating that efforts to develop renewable energy, add nuclear power, and modify power plants to reduce carbon “were among the
most capital-intensive [GHG emission-reduction options] . . . evaluated . . . [and] tend to
have the longest lead times”); id. at 64-65 (describing barriers to implementation of alternative power sources).
108. For example, California’s Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) has determined
that increasing energy efficiency is the state’s most cost-effective mechanism for meeting
demand. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, PUC’S ENERGY LEADERSHIP (2007), available at
ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.gov/puc/070319_revenergystory0107.pdf.
109. See, e.g., CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 5-6 (listing strategies utilities could use to
enhance energy efficiency).
110. See id. For example, California’s Pacific, Gas & Electric Company, a major northern Calfornia utility, has offered rebates on compact fluorescent light bulbs and appliances.
See Rebates and Energy Efficiency for Your Home, http://www.pge.com/myhome/
saveenergymoney/rebates/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
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overcome the capital costs associated with efficiency retrofits or alternative
energy investments.111 If authorized by state regulation, utilities could also
develop rate structures that rewarded conservation by charging higher rates
for higher levels of energy use.112 Utilities could engage in a variety of informational and educational programs, including documenting energy use
and making such information publically available, providing standards for
labeling homes or products, and increasing public awareness about how
and why consumers should reduce energy use.113 Such informational campaigns are essential to the success of market incentives, since consumers
need to be aware of available incentives and how to take advantage of
them. Informational campaigns are also crucial to inducing behavioral
change: without information about the impact of their personal decisions,
individuals are less likely to perceive a moral obligation to reduce energy
use, an obligation that could reduce energy use independent of market incentives.
Notwithstanding the positive role that utility demand-reduction programs could play, they are unlikely to induce sufficient adoption of energy
efficiency in buildings. Although emission limits will give utilities an incentive to encourage consumers to reduce energy use, some state utility
rate regulations create the opposite incentive by tying utility profits to the
amount of energy generated, thereby creating a disincentive to reducing energy demand.114 Facing an emissions cap, a utility might emphasize investments in low-carbon energy sources or carbon sequestration rather than
reduce demand so as to preserve the level of energy generated. A comprehensive and effective long-term policy would incentivize both low-carbon
fuel sources and demand reduction efforts.
Even if utilities do create demand-reduction incentives, like rebates or
financing, the incentives must operate effectively. As discussed further be-

111. One financing mechanism under consideration is for utilities to initially finance consumers’ energy efficiency or alternative energy investments. Consumers would then pay
back the “loan” through the savings they realize on their monthly utility bills. See CPUC
PLAN, supra note 74, at 16 (observing the importance of developing financing mechanisms
to offset initial capital costs). The CPUC has recognized that utilities cannot fully fund energy efficiency; instead the CPUC expects utilities to “leverage and build upon financing
options available from private markets and other government initiatives.” Id.
112. See id. at 6 (observing generally that price and rate design can create incentives for
energy efficiency and other demand-side management actions).
113. See generally id. at 5, 16, 27 (describing a range of education and information activities).
114. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 37-38, 46; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70,
at 20 (observing that “power producers’ sustained earnings growth [is often] at odds with
resource efficiency”).
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low,115 consumers must be aware of both the incentives and how to take
advantage of them. The incentives must also be potent enough to generate
the hoped-for behavior. For example, a rebate or financing that did not
cover the full cost of the investment might fail to have a sufficient motivational impact.
2.

Direct Market Pressures

Legislation controlling utilities could also increase the cost of energy,
creating a direct market incentive for consumers to invest in energy efficiency.116 Given its high carbon intensity, utilities are likely to shift away
from coal, the nation’s cheapest and most plentiful energy source.117 Utilities are likely to switch to natural gas or to develop new renewable energy
sources, such as wind, solar, or nuclear energy, that are currently more expensive than coal-fired power plants.118 As energy costs increase, owners
would, in theory, have an incentive to retrofit existing buildings to make
them more energy efficient, and purchasers would increase their demand
for new green buildings.119
While higher energy costs are likely to reduce demand to some extent,
market imperfections and legitimate social policy concerns will constrain
the market’s effectiveness.120 First, the market might not generate a sufficient price signal to stimulate behavioral changes.121 In some states, utility
regulations limit the utilities’ ability to pass through higher costs, thus preventing the price signal from flowing to consumers.122 The political controversy associated with increasing energy prices may also make policy115. The impediments to unilateral consumer action are discussed more extensively below. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
116. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xiii (observing that achieving GHG emission reductions will require investments in the power sector that are likely to increase electricity prices).
117. See id. at 12.
118. See id. at xv.
119. One study of metropolitan carbon footprints found a link between higher electricity
prices and per capita electricity footprints. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 26. Although this Article does not primarily address industry, increasing energy costs could also
prompt industries to become more energy efficient. However, some of the same market imperfections that could impede consumer responses could also limit industry response.
120. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 69-70 (summarizing market imperfections
that currently impede economically rational energy efficiency investments).
121. Professors Doremus and Hanemann note that the acid rain program to reduce sulfur
and nitrogen oxides from utilities did not lead to energy price increases and, consequently,
did not incentivize consumer conservation. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at
814.
122. Robert B. McKinstry et al., Federal Climate Change Legislation as if the States
Matter, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 7 (2008).
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makers reluctant to design programs that would increase energy prices to a
level that would motivate change. As the McKinsey Report states, “motivating end users to act based on price signals alone would likely require
price stimuli well beyond what may be politically feasible.”123 From a social justice perspective, the regressive impacts of increasing energy costs
could also lead policymakers to dampen the price impacts of carbon policies.124 Absent measures to mitigate regressive impacts, like governmentfinanced energy retrofits or direct compensation, policymakers may design
a cap-and-trade program to limit the extent of potential price increases and,
consequently, limit the extent to which prices would incentivize greater efficiency.
Even if price signals do reach consumers, they may fail to motivate reductions in consumption due to the relative inelasticity of energy demand.125 Consumers often fail to respond to price signals due to the “split
incentives” problem.126 Those making capital investments in buildings or
appliances, like builders and landlords, have an incentive to minimize initial investment costs and are therefore less likely to make energy efficiency
investments, since such investments are likely to be more expensive at the
outset even though they are more economically efficient in the long-run.127

123. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 70.
124. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for Clean Energy
Policy, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 1197, 1202 (2001) [hereinafter Brown, Market Failures] (observing that energy costs can be a significant expense for low-income families, “averaging 15%
compared to 4% for the typical US citizen”).
125. See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN
CLIMATE POLICY 2 (2008), available at http://www.aceee.org/energy/climate/climate_
paper2008.pdf (“Given the low price elasticity of the demand for energy, price increases
resulting from a carbon cap will have very little effect on energy consumption.”). The
McKinsey Report observes that consumers have not, historically, responded to variations in
energy prices. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 70. Professor Brown notes that
“[e]nergy efficiency is not a major concern for most consumers because energy costs are not
high relative to the cost of many other goods and services.” Brown, Market Failures, supra
note 124, at 1202. That suggests that energy price increases would have to be relatively
high before they would motivate behavioral change.
126. See MARILYN A. BROWN ET AL., OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., CARBON LOCK-IN: BARRIERS TO DEPLOYING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES 101, 102 (2007) [hereinafter BROWN ET AL., CARBON LOCK-IN]. Professor Brown observes that this problem has also
been termed the “principal-agent” problem. See Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at
1199; see also MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 37 (“Issues of agency and duration of
ownership have historically been a major barrier to capturing energy and carbon efficiency
in [the air conditioning] sector, as those who bear the initial cost of improvements are often
not lifetime recipients of the benefits.”); id. at 41.
127. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1199; see also MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 39 (observing that builders do not bear operating costs but do pay first costs,
so they have “less of an incentive to install efficient building systems”); id. at 40 (discussing
the split incentive problem in the water heating context). Tax policies could also impact the
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Purchasers and tenants, who are more likely to be concerned about lifecycle costs, do not have control over the relevant capital investments.128
Builders and landlords have an incentive to invest in energy efficiency only
to the extent that the investments create higher purchase or rental prices.129
While there is some evidence that green measures are generating a premium,130 uncertainty regarding future energy costs could create uncertainty
about the utility of the investment.131 In addition, green features may be
more likely to generate a premium for wealthier consumers and commercial entities; poorer consumers may hesitate to pay more up front, even if
the investment makes long-term economic sense.132 Moreover, since energy costs are currently a relatively small component of most commercial
entities’ operating costs, it is not clear that energy efficiency features will
create a significant premium in commercial markets.
Consumers may also fail to respond to price signals due to their lack of
information.133 Consumers currently have little access to information about
the energy efficiency of either existing or new construction.134 They may
also be unaware of the extent to which retrofits could increase energy efficiency and result in long-term cost savings, be unaware of appliances’ relative energy efficiency and associated cost savings, and be unaware of the
steps they could take to reduce energy use.135
preferred ratio between capital and operating costs, with preferential treatment for operating
costs creating a disincentive to increasing capital costs. See id. at 1200.
128. Id.; BROWN ET AL., CARBON LOCK-IN, supra note 126, at 102.
129. See Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1200 (discussing dynamic in landlord/tenant context).
130. See NORM MILLER ET AL., S.D. SCH. OF BUS. ADMIN., DOES GREEN PAY OFF? (2008),
available
at
http://www.sandiego.edu/business/documents/USDEconofBeingGreen.
pdf.
131. Cf. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1202 (observing that “uncertainty
about future energy prices” can be a barrier to energy-efficient investments). Energyefficient investments would also generate a sale or rental premium only to the extent that
consumers have the sophistication to estimate the economic savings associated with efficiency. See id. (noting that “one of the reasons builders generally minimize first costs . . .
[is that they believe] (probably correctly) that the higher cost of more efficient equipment
will not be capitalized into a higher resale value” since purchasers do not understand how to
do the savings calculation).
132. See BROWN ET AL., CARBON LOCK-IN, supra note 126, at 102 (observing that lowincome households and small businesses might find it difficult to access credit to finance
energy-efficient investments).
133. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 41.
134. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1203; cf. BROWN ET AL., supra note 11,
at 51 (observing the need for federal legislation requiring greater disclosure of home energy
consumption at time-of-sale).
135. See Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1201; Doremus & Hanemann, supra
note 84, at 815; see also MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 22, 37, 41; see generally
McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 7 (noting that consumers “may lack the knowledge . . .
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While energy efficiency improvements are cost-effective in the long-run,
consumers, particularly low-income consumers, may not have sufficient
capital to make initial energy-efficiency investments in existing buildings.136 Even if they have the means, residents or commercial entities may
not remain in the building long enough to pay back their investment, and,
in the event of sale, the energy-efficiency investment may not have created
a sufficient, or a sufficiently certain, sales premium to justify the initial investment.137 Studies indicate that consumers are unwilling to make investments with a payback period longer than two or three years.138
Finally, to the extent that price signals successfully induce energy efficiency investments, the investments could result in reduced demand that, in
turn, ultimately reduces energy prices, ending the incentive effect.139 Notwithstanding the potential for initial success, market mechanisms may thus
create only a temporary, rather than a long-term, incentive to reduce demand.
National market-based proposals that focus on utilities could promote
utility-sponsored demand-reduction programs and directly spur green
building efforts, both of which would reduce consumption to some extent.
That said, the invisible hand of the market is unlikely to stimulate enough
investment in energy efficiency, notwithstanding its economic rationalto implement many demand reduction and energy-efficiency measures”); Vandenbergh &
Steinemann, supra note 2, at 1725, 1731-32 (observing that individuals have insufficient
information about energy efficiency to implement climate protection norms).
136. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 40-41; Brown, Market Failures, supra
note 124, at 1202; McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 7 (noting that consumers may not
have “financial wherewithal” to invest in energy efficiency). Professors Vandenbergh,
Steinemann, and Ackerly propose programs to provide resources to poor households to enable them to invest in energy efficiency measures. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra
note 2, at 1735; see generally Michael Vandenbergh & Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate
Change: The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2007). California’s Public Utilities
Commission has developed an innovative Low Income Energy Efficiency program to “provide no-cost energy efficiency and appliance testing and repair measures to qualified low
income customers in rental and customer-owned residences.” CPUC PLAN, supra note 74,
at 20.
137. See CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 16 (observing that financing mechanisms need to
include provisions to obtain repayment from successor owners so that the prospect of selling
the property does not dissuade current owners from investing in energy efficiency improvements).
138. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 22, 40. For example, in a study in which
consumers were given a choice between two refrigerators of differing efficiencies, over half
of the purchasers selected the less expensive and less efficient refrigerator, even though the
more expensive and more efficient refrigerator provided an annual return on investment of
around 50%. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1198.
139. See AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., supra note 125, at 2 (stating
that energy efficiency measures could change the “demand-supply balance,” and “offset the
higher energy prices resulting from a cap-and-trade system”).
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ity.140 More direct mechanisms to spur energy-efficient buildings are necessary.141
III. THE LOCAL ROLE IN ADDRESSING CONSUMPTION
Local decisionmakers currently have significant control over the demand-reduction measures available in the land use, transportation, and
building sectors.142 Without attempting to be comprehensive, this Part first
briefly describes the types of local measures that could reduce VMT and
electricity consumption.143 It then articulates the institutional justifications
for retaining a degree of local autonomy in developing such measures.
Lastly, it highlights the extent to which cities have already embraced their
role in addressing the fundamental causes of climate change.
A.

Types of Local Initiatives to Reduce Energy Demand

Urban comprehensive plans and zoning play a critical role in establishing land use patterns that could reduce VMT.144 A municipal government’s
140. As the McKinsey Report states, “simply imposing ‘carbon caps’ on point-source
emitters might provide the incentive—but not the means—to extract the energy efficiency
potential that is distributed across millions of energy users. Policy support might consist of
standards, mandates and/or incentives . . . .” See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at xiv
(observing that energy efficiency is the most cost-effective mechanism for reducing emissions but that “persistent barriers to market efficiency will need to be overcome”); id. at 40
(suggesting that, given market barriers to installing energy efficiency, “some form of policy
intervention . . . may be necessary”).
141. A study comparing the impact of appliance standards versus market forces found
that significant additional energy savings were achieved through the promulgation of required standards. Brown, Market Failures, supra note 124, at 1205. The CPUC, which has
considered its own demand-reduction role, has concluded that “[t]here is no policy tool
more essential for the widespread and persistent transformation of energy performance in
California than energy codes and standards.” CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 60. As the
CPUC notes, standards “make better energy performance mandatory, and not just for early
adopters or self-selected consumers . . . .” Id.
142. Cf. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation:
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 701 (2008) (noting that policies relating to “electricity regulation, building energy efficiency, transportation infrastructure, and
land use and development patterns . . . can be better designed and implemented by [subnational actors]”).
143. Local governments could also reduce emissions through many additional measures,
including facilitating or sponsoring renewable energy sources and controlling methane releases from landfills. In this Article, however, I focus on local governments’ role in reducing consumption.
144. Such planning does not, however, occur in a vacuum. It is strongly influenced by
underlying tax structures and regional and state infrastructure decisions. See Norman Williams, Jr., The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 80 (1970) (describing land use controls as a function of zoning, property taxes and their role in financing local
services, and infrastructure choices made by larger entities). As discussed further below,
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comprehensive or general plan shapes growth patterns.145 Historically, local plans and the zoning regulations that implement them have promoted
sprawling growth by limiting density and separating land uses so that residents must drive for work, school, or errands.146 To reverse this pattern
and create the necessary preconditions for reducing VMT, municipalities
could revise their general plans to adopt “smart growth” techniques that not
only limit growth, but allow more compact development.147 As others have
elaborated in more detail, smart growth and “new urbanist” techniques include such measures as permitting increased density, allowing mixed uses,
encouraging infill, and encouraging development patterns that will sustain
public transportation.148 In addition to direct requirements, zoning provisions could create development impact fees and permitting incentives designed to induce desired development patterns.149
While land use reforms could reduce VMT somewhat by shortening
driving distances, more dramatic decreases in VMT are likely to require a
shift from private cars to public transportation and to non-vehicular transit.
The two are related: a number of the land use changes proposed above,
like increased density and mixed use development, would not only shorten
driving distances, but facilitate reduced automobile usage.150 Municipalisuccessful land use reforms will also require addressing a number of the underlying causes
of existing low-density zoning decisions. See infra notes 204-30 and accompanying text.
145. See NOLON, supra note 101, at 16-17.
146. See, e.g., LEVINE, supra note 32, at 2-3; NOLON, supra note 101, at 30.
147. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 82; Ziegler, supra note 16, at 28. Smart growth
mechanisms that limit sprawl and encourage denser mixed use “livable” communities have
also come under the rubric of “New Urbanism.” See, e.g., EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at
5.
148. See, e.g., EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 4; J. Kevin Healy, Local Initiatives, in
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 426-29 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (listing
zoning and land use policies that could reduce municipal GHG emissions). The California
Attorney General’s Office (“AG’s Office) has recognized the importance of comprehensive
planning to reducing future GHG emissions. Under California’s environmental review statute, the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the AG’s Office has sued municipalities that have enacted growth-inducing general plans without considering and addressing
their future greenhouse gas emission consequences. See Michael B. Gerrard, Climate
Change and the Environmental Impact Review Process, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 20,
22 (2008). The AG’s Office provides a detailed list of direct and indirect GHG-reducing
measures that municipalities can include in their general plans. See EDWIN G. BROWN, JR.,
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT: ADDRESSING
GLOBAL WARMING IMPACTS AT THE LOCAL AGENCY LEVEL 5-10 (2008), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/GW_mitigation_measures.pdf.
149. See Healy, supra note 148, at 428.
150. See id. at 427. For example, public transportation operates best with sufficient
population density to justify frequent and cost-effective service. See Buzbee, supra note 53,
at 74. Mixed use developments are more likely to make trips to work or errands walkable or
bicyclable.
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ties alone or in combination with regional agencies can encourage a shift
away from private cars by providing comfortable, convenient, reliable, and
affordable public transportation alternatives.151 Local governments can
further facilitate non-vehicular transit by making cities easily walkable and
bikable.152
Cities can also play a key role in reducing electricity consumption, although their role is somewhat less central than in the land use context.153
More stringent federal energy efficiency standards for buildings are a distinct possibility in the future. For now, however, cities and states are likely
to continue to play a key role in formulating and implementing programs to
reduce building-sector energy consumption. In states that give local governments the requisite authority, local governments can draft building
codes to reduce electricity and natural gas consumption.154 Measures to increase energy efficiency in new buildings could include requirements relating to structural design, insulation, windows, lighting, heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning systems, water heating, appliances, and siting or landscaping requirements that implicate energy use.155 In some areas, water
conservation through appropriate landscaping and water-saving household
appliances could also reduce household carbon use.156 Jurisdictions can
consider direct design requirements,157 certification requirements that require a certain level of efficiency, but without specifying the mechanisms
by which it is to be achieved,158 and incentive programs.159
151. See Healy, supra note 148, at 425-26.
152. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 4-5.
153. Appliance standards are generally the province of federal, and sometimes state, action. See Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 825. The federal government
has played a modest role in establishing minimum energy codes for buildings and could do
more. Some states, like California, have strong state energy codes. See, e.g., Cal. Energy
Comm’n, California’s Energy Efficiency Standards for Residential and Nonresidential
Buildings, http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). Even in states with
strong energy codes, local governments are proposing more stringent energy codes. See
Cal. Energy Comm’n, Local Ordinances Exceeding the 2005 Building Energy Efficiency
Standards, http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2005standards/ordinances_exceeding_2005_
building_standards.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
154. See Healy, supra note 148, at 425-26.
155. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 35-40 (describing types of energy efficiency improvements for new and existing buildings). In addition to reducing demand,
green building provisions could also require or facilitate renewable energy, like site-based
solar or wind power. See Sussman, supra note 71 at 23-35.
156. In California, the water supply system is the state’s largest energy consumer. See
Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 827.
157. See, e.g., Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 153.
158. Many jurisdictions require local construction to meet the “Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design” (“LEED”) standards established by the U.S. Green Building Council. See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED INITIATIVES IN GOVERNMENTS AND SCHOOLS
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Local governments could also impose energy efficiency requirements on
existing residential and commercial buildings. One mechanism is to require energy efficiency improvements at the time of sale.160 Government
regulations or programs could also complement and enhance market incentives for energy efficiency by increasing the quality and availability of consumer information161 to enhance the efficacy of existing market incentives
and help consumers realize green preferences.162 Local governmentsponsored financing mechanisms could help consumers address the initial
capital costs of energy efficiency investments.163
Even if state or federal governments end up playing a stronger role in establishing relevant building codes, local governments are likely to continue
to play a key role in ensuring that the codes are adequately enforced. State
energy codes are generally enforced at the local level by local building inspectors. Adequate local enforcement is key to effective implementation.164

(2008), available at https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=691. Although
adopting green building standards does not automatically result in energy savings, the green
building requirements are likely to increase energy efficiency. Energy efficiency is one
among several categories that receive points in the certification process, however, creating
the possibility that a building could be certified through non-energy-related green features.
The number of points accrued determines the level of LEED certification achieved, ranging
from simple “Certified” to “Platinum.” Jurisdictions differ significantly in the stringency of
the certification they require or reward.
159. Local government incentive programs include policies like permit fee reductions,
expedited permitting, and property tax adjustments. See YUDELSON ASSOCS., NAT’L ASS’N
OF INDUS. & OFFICE PROP., GREEN BUILDING INCENTIVES THAT WORK: A LOOK AT HOW LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE INCENTIVIZING GREEN DEVELOPMENT (2007), available at
http://www.naiop.org/foundation/greenincentives.pdf.
160. See CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 16, 84.
161. See id. at 32 (discussing government programs to benchmark commercial buildings
and require disclosure of energy information as well as potential local government programs
to condition the renewal of building occupancy certificates on minimum energy benchmarks).
162. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing the role of information in
enhancing market incentives and inducing behavioral change).
163. See, e.g., CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 32 (discussing importance of financing to
encouraging investments in energy efficiency in existing buildings). In 2008, California
adopted legislation that would give cities the authority to provide local citizens with loans
for energy efficiency and renewable energy and allow them to repay the loan over time
through their property taxes. See Margot Roosevelt, Green Energy Financing OK’d, L.A.
TIMES, July 23, 2008, at B3.
164. Cf. CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 16 (observing the importance of effective enforcement of energy codes); id. at 61, 82 (observing that the state’s energy code is enforced
by local governments); id. at 85 (noting that local enforcement appears to be weak).
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Institutional Justifications for Local Control

There are strong institutional justifications for retaining a local or regional role in reducing consumption. First, much of the consumption that
lies behind GHG emissions, like driving behavior and buildings’ energy
use, takes place in cities.165 While that does not preclude other levels of
government from taking regulatory action, municipalities are in a strong
position to address the causes of climate change.
Furthermore, the sources of GHG emissions and the opportunities for
GHG emission reductions vary considerably across the nation.166 Local
governments are well positioned to determine the most significant sources
of demand within their jurisdiction and tailor strategies accordingly.167 For
example, cities that rely on carbon-intensive energy sources, like coal-fired
power, might devote particular attention to increasing energy efficiency
and encouraging local renewable energy in comparison with cities, like Seattle, that use less carbon-intensive sources of electricity.168 Weather patterns might also determine priorities; cities in both hot and cold climates
might focus more on energy efficiency measures than cities in more temperate climates. The most suitable strategies could also depend upon
whether the area anticipates growth. Changing land use policies to reduce
sprawl and creating new building standards are particularly important in
growing areas,169 while strategies to address existing buildings are likely to
predominate in areas where population is stagnant. The nature of a re165. As Professor Robert Verchick has stated: “[Cities] are where the pollution is . . . .”
Robert R.M. Verchick, Why the Global Environment Needs Local Government: Lessons
from the Johannesburg Summit, 35 URB. LAW. 471, 475 (2003).
166. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 70, at 22, 67-68. The McKinsey Report observes that GHG abatement strategies have significantly differing costs in different regions
reflecting “regional differences in population growth and/or density, carbon intensity of local power general portfolios, energy productivity, climate, availability of renewable energy
sources, forest cover, agricultural orientation, concentration of industrial activity, and other
factors.” Id. at 22.
167. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (observing that local governments can provide
goods and services efficiently given their capacity “to match distinctive local conditions and
preferences”); Buzbee, supra note 53, at 94 (arguing that local governments have land use
authority because their local knowledge gives them the requisite institutional competence);
Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Legislation in Context, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 245, 247-48 (2008)
[hereinafter Osofsky, Climate Change].
168. See GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28, at 5 (noting differences in carbon intensity of
regionally-common fuel sources); see also JOHN BAILEY, LESSONS FROM THE PIONEERS:
TACKLING GLOBAL WARMING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 3, 9 (2007), available at
http://www.newrules.org/de/pioneers.pdf (observing that different fuel sources have a significant impact on cities’ carbon footprints).
169. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 78 (observing that high growth areas are more
likely to reduce VMT through smart growth land use measures).
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gion’s economic base could also influence appropriate strategies. Mixed
uses may be an appropriate land use strategy for non-polluting industries
and employers, but impose unacceptable public health risks in areas that
rely on heavier industry.
Many classic arguments in favor of local control resonate in democratic
theory. Given the local consequences of land use and building policies and
their importance in shaping metropolitan space, federalism advocates
would argue that local governments should be given the power to express
the preferences of local citizens, preferences that could be diluted and
harder to discern in larger fora.170 Moreover, some argue that citizens can
more easily and effectively participate in local governmental decisions than
in state or national venues.171
Local governments can also serve as classic “laboratories of invention.”
The local climate change and smart growth initiatives blossoming around
the country will provide insights into the strength and weaknesses of a variety of strategies.172 Rather than locking into one, potentially flawed,
model, the entire nation could benefit from a diversity of approaches.
C.

The Local Commitment

Local action is not only practically important and institutionally justified, but well underway. Local governments are recognizing their important role in climate change policy. As of January 25, 2009, 910 mayors
have signed the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement
(the “Agreement”),173 drafted in 2005 in response to the United States’ continued rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. The Agreement commits its signatories to strive to “meet or beat” the Kyoto Protocol’s climate change objective for the United States of 7% below 1990 emissions by 2012,174 an

170. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1123-24; Buzbee, supra note 53, at 92.
171. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1123-24; Verchick, supra note 165, at 475-77.
172. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 182-83 (2006); Stewart, supra note 142, at 700-01.
173. See Map of Participating Mayors, Mayors’ Climate Protection Center,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/map.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2009). Over 172
U.S. municipalities have joined the “Cities for Climate Protection Campaign” of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (“ICLEI”), which provides resources for
municipalities who follow a prescribed process for setting greenhouse gas emission reduction goals.
174. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT
(2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.
pdf.
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ambitious target in light of the almost 15% increase in U.S. emissions between 1990 and 2006.175
Land use, transportation, and buildings policies figure prominently
among the strategies identified within the agreement for meeting local
emissions targets.176 Participating mayors have agreed to adopt anti-sprawl
land use policies and to promote bicycles, public transit, and programs to
reduce commuting.177 They also commit to making energy efficiency a
“priority” by updating building codes and promoting sustainable building
practices generally, and by improving energy efficiency within municipal
buildings more specifically.178
Of course, signing the agreement does not guarantee its effective implementation. A January 2007 assessment of ten cities whose mayors had
signed the Agreement and are known as environmentally active indicated
that all of the cities had recently increased, rather than decreased, their
GHG emissions and were highly unlikely to meet their reduction goals.179
Population increases contributed to the emissions growth in some instances, but in others GHG emissions outpaced population growth, revealing an increase in per capita emissions.180 As of early 2007, cities were
hoping that changes in state or federal policy, like increasing renewable energy and increasing vehicle fuel economy, would achieve most of the reductions,181 and had undertaken only a few discrete one-time actions at the
local level.182 Municipal strategies to comply with the Agreement have no
doubt evolved since the January 2007 report. The report nonetheless reveals the risk of a gap between political rhetoric and concrete implementation.

175. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, at ES-4.
176. In addition to land use and buildings, other emission reduction strategies the Agreement suggests include promoting alternative energy, minimizing emissions from waste disposal, reducing emissions from local vehicle fleets, increasing water use efficiency and recycling, promoting urban forests as sinks and for shade, and public education functions.
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 174.
177. Id. at 1 (advocating “[a]dopt[ing] and enforce[ing] land-use policies that reduce
sprawl, preserve open space, and create compact, walkable urban communities” and
“[p]romot[ing] transportation options such as bicycle trails, commute trip reduction programs, incentives for car pooling and public transit”).
178. Id.
179. BAILEY, supra note 168, at 10-12.
180. Id. Of the ten cities examined, the only ones to reduce their per capita GHG emissions were Austin, Texas, and Portland, Oregon. Id. at 12.
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. at 13-14. For example, many of the cities reduced municipal emissions through
capturing methane from landfills. Id. at 14.
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Several examples reveal the potential inherent in local action to reduce
demand. Portland, Oregon has already seen the fruits of its earlier land use
and transit policies. Portland’s sustainable development initiatives began
in the 1970s, when Portland adopted urban growth boundaries to stem
sprawl and established the nation’s first local energy policy.183 To implement the carbon dioxide reduction plan it adopted in 1993, the city developed two new light rail lines and increased public transit use by 75% from
1990 levels.184 The city has also overseen the construction of green buildings and weatherized 10,000 multi-family units as well as 800 homes.185
Although Portland has failed to reduce its overall emissions and failed to
meet its carbon dioxide reduction goals due to population growth, the city’s
multiple GHG reduction initiatives have reduced per capita emissions by
12.5% since the early 1990s.186 Arguably, reductions in per capita emissions are more significant than reductions in net emissions, since the new
Portland residents are likely emitting at a lower per capita rate than they
would have emitted in another location.
The Sacramento, California region has engaged in an ambitious regional
planning effort to counter projected increases in congestion and pollution.
In 2004, a regional agency representing the six counties comprising the
greater Sacramento, California metropolitan area adopted a “Preferred
Blueprint Scenario for 2050” that outlined regional growth principles and
identified regional growth parameters that local governments can, on a voluntary basis, implement.187 The relevant growth principles include using
existing assets through infill development, compact development, mixed
use development, and providing alternative transportation alternatives.188
The regional agency predicts that, by 2050, the Blueprint will lead to an
183. See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate
Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 415-16 (2008) [hereinafter Osofsky & Levit, The
Scale of Networks].
184. Id. at 417. Seattle has also developed a regional transit plan to reduce driving and
increase public transportation. Healy, supra note 148, at 425.
185. Osofsky & Levit, The Scale of Networks, supra note 183, at 417.
186. Id. Portland’s success is attributable not only to its land use and transportation initiatives, but also to investments in energy efficiency, solid waste and recycling, urban forestry, and renewable energy. Id. at 416.
187. See SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF GOV’TS & VALLEY VISION, PREFERRED BLUEPRINT ALTERNATIVE (2007) [hereinafter PREFERRED BLUEPRINT ALTERNATIVE], available at
http://www.sacregionblueprint.org/sacregionblueprint/the_project/BP_Insert_JAN_2005.pdf
; Ana Campoy, With Gas Over $4, Cities Explore Whether It’s Smart to Be Dense, WALL
ST. J., July 1, 2008, at A1. Although voluntary, many of the local governments are implementing the blueprint’s agenda. See Sacramento Blueprint, Local Government Features,
http://www.sacregionblueprint.org/sacregionblueprint/the_project/localGovtFeatures.cfm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
188. PREFERRED BLUEPRINT ALTERNATIVE, supra note 187.
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average household VMT of 34.9 miles per day instead of the 47.2 miles per
day predicted based on current development trends.189 Carbon dioxide
emissions in 2050 are projected to be 14% lower than the business-as-usual
estimate.190 In conjunction with the regional Blueprint, the regional agency
proposed a draft municipal transportation plan in March 2008 that is designed to complement the smart growth initiatives outlined in the Blueprint
and facilitate driving reductions and alternatives.191
Elsewhere, individual development projects are increasingly combining
uses and becoming denser.192 Rejecting the pattern of sprawling singlefamily home development, the California cities of San Mateo and San Jose
have recently unveiled plans for new mixed use developments providing a
variety of housing options.193
On the green building front, according to the U.S. Green Building Council, 152 localities around the country are moving beyond federal and state
minimum requirements to adopt their own green building requirements for
municipal and, in some cases, private, construction—requirements that
could lead to more energy-efficient buildings.194 Many of these efforts
have been initiated within the last year.
The commitment and initiative being taken at the local level is inspiring
and justified. Local action will be critical to achieving deep GHG emission
reductions. The fundamental question is: can we rely on individual localities to take the necessary initiative, or do we need broader state and federal
structures through which to stimulate and shape local actions? The next
section addresses this question.

189. Id. at 9.
190. Id.
191. See SACRAMENTO AREA COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
PLAN FOR 2035 (2008) [hereinafter METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION PLAN], available at
http://sacog.org/mtp/2035/final-mtp.
192. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 27 (describing a 2003 listing showing 647 “new
urbanist” developments).
193. See John King, Smart Growth at the San Mateo Racetrack, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 17,
2008, at B1; James Temple, San Jose Leaders Try to Reverse Urban Sprawl, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 17, 2008, at B1.
194. U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 158. Although adopting green building
standards does not automatically result in energy savings, the green building requirements
are likely to increase energy efficiency. Many of the local requirements or incentives are
tied to the LEED certification requirements created and implemented by the U.S. Green
Building Council. Id. Energy efficiency is only one among several categories that receive
points in the certification process, creating the possibility that a building could be certified
through non-energy-related green features.
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IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO LOCAL ACTION
Notwithstanding the importance of existing local actions and the centrality of local governments to achieving climate change goals, local governments are unlikely to undertake sufficient efforts solely on their own initiative. Disincentives to collective action, political, social, and economic
forces, and federal and state laws are all likely to impede sufficient local
action. Ultimately, federal and state laws will need to establish cooperative
federalist structures that require the necessary local action while simultaneously maximizing the benefits of local autonomy.
A.

Collective Action Impediments to Local Initiatives

With a transboundary international legal problem like climate change,
collective action problems are likely to create disincentives for the necessary level of local initiatives. Addressing climate change could create a
fundamental disparity in the distribution of costs and benefits. Climate
change measures could impose costs on local governments by impairing
their ability to attract desired or exclude undesired development.195 Meanwhile, climate change benefits accruing from local action are incremental,
remote, and widely distributed. A community that incurs local economic
costs by adopting land use changes or more stringent building standards
will not reap corresponding climate change benefits.196
That said, the cost/benefit calculus in the climate change context is complicated. First, although a given community cannot protect itself from the
environmental consequences of climate change by reducing its emissions, it
may act in the hope that it will inspire similar action in other localities and
that the cumulative impact of local reductions will be environmentally significant.197
Second, local government actions could lead to non-climate benefits that
compensate for local costs. Local political leaders may perceive personal
political benefits to setting popular climate change goals. If political capital is the primary benefit, however, then local regulation may not go far,
since concrete implementation steps could be more politically controver-

195. See generally GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28, at 11 (observing that environmentally-friendly measures are likely to deter development).
196. See SAFIROVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 31 (observing that urban areas will not reap
climate change benefits from land use changes and that policies to reduce energy consumption should therefore “be national, not local”); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, MicroMotives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119,
119 (2008).
197. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 196, at 129.
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sial. As noted above, cities risk a gap between rhetoric and implementation.
Conceivably, however, smart growth and building requirements could
generate substantive short-term non-climate co-benefits that would outweigh their costs, like healthier and more livable cities, preservation of
open space, and cheaper infrastructure and energy costs.198 But smart
growth and green building measures have not revolutionized the built environment to date, raising questions as to whether cities truly value their
benefits more than their perceived costs. Unless cities are convinced of associated non-climate-related co-benefits, the imbalance in costs and benefits renders sufficiently widespread and vigorous local action unlikely.199
Moreover, the leakage concerns that have haunted state legislatures arise
in the local context as well and may disincentivize local action.200 Municipalities considering zoning or green building limitations face the risk that
such limitations would drive housing or commercial developers to locations
that do not impose constraints.201 If limitations in fact drive development
elsewhere, then a municipality that adopted local climate change regulations would have incurred the loss of desired development to no end, since
the development, and its problematic emissions, simply went elsewhere.
The fear of leakage thus creates a disincentive for local action.
Local entities might also hope to “free ride” on other localities’ efforts.202 Given the global benefits of climate change reduction efforts, individual cities might hope to benefit from other cities’ initiative without
making any (perceived) sacrifices themselves.
Cities have already taken a surprising level of initiative in light of these
collective action challenges. Nonetheless, the collective action challenges
suggest why seemingly enthusiastic cities may fail to follow through on
their political rhetoric, and why some cities may not jump on the band-

198. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 27-31; Stewart, supra note 142, at 691-92 (noting the “collateral local benefits” that cities might experience if they adopt transportation,
land use, and building measures to address climate change).
199. See Stewart, supra note 142, at 701 (“Local jurisdictions will presumably not undertake independent climate regulation unless they expect that the economic and environmental
benefits will outweigh the costs, including leakage costs”).
200. See Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 795 (discussing how leakage concerns are likely to chill unilateral state action to address climate change).
201. See GLAESER & KAHN, supra note 28, at 11 (suggesting that environmental land use
measures deter development and shift it to areas with less environmental regulation);
Ziegler, supra note 16, at 59 n.127 (observing that cities that attempt to control sprawl risk
losing their tax base to surrounding towns).
202. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 196, at 120, 129 (suggesting that free riding would
be a rational response where actors cannot reap the direct benefits of their regulatory actions).
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wagon at all. Collective action problems are not, moreover, the only impediment to local initiatives, particularly when they implicate politically
and socially sensitive land use parameters.
B.

Political, Economic, and Social Disincentives to Local Action

On a fundamental level, inertia is a powerful force. Residents, city
planners, and developers may be reluctant to envision alternative models.
Individuals, comfortable with their existing lifestyles, could find change
unappealing or threatening.203
Local governments, properly serving their democratic function, also focus on local rather than regional—much less global—interests. This parochialism creates a powerful force against land use or other local changes.
“Fiscal zoning” designed to maximize municipal revenue and minimize
costs has driven (and is likely to continue to drive) purely local land use
decisions. 204 Communities compete for continued residential or business
expansion.205 Suburban communities have engaged in low-density zoning
to keep property values high and exclude affordable housing that could lead
to higher public service costs.206 As a political matter, existing residents
who consciously chose a spacious suburban environment are likely to resist
proposals for infill or for more compact development.207 Even communities that have adopted “smart growth” measures have sometimes served parochial rather than regional interests. As Professor Edward Ziegler has observed, land use measures with a “smart growth” patina have set growth
boundaries to preserve open space for the benefit of local residents, but

203. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1025; see also DEBORAH SALON & DANIEL SPERLING,
CITY CARBON BUDGETS: A POLICY MECHANISM TO REDUCE VEHICLE TRAVEL AND GREENGAS
EMISSIONS
9-10
(2008),
available
at
HOUSE
http://pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/publication_detail.php?
id=1178 (observing that a significant challenge to developing local strategies to reduce
VMT will be citizens’ willingness to accept lifestyle changes); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 61
& n.138 (noting that regional efforts to achieve effective smart growth will be difficult in
light of voters’ fear of the unknown).
204. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1134; Williams, supra note 144, at 82-85 (describing how tax policies create exclusionary zoning incentives).
205. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 95.
206. Briffault, supra note 167, at 1134; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 35;
Ziegler, supra note 16, at 58.
207. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1024; Peter W. Salsich, Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming A Long History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 459, 497-98 (2007) (describing suburban opposition to development proposals that would increase density).
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have not increased density, thereby pushing new development even further
out and increasing sprawl to the detriment of the region.208
Nor do local governments function as perfect democracies. While local
governments have the potential to provide a broader participatory forum
than their state or federal counterparts, local governments are subject to
power politics. For example, influential developers and builders are likely
to oppose constraints, like stricter building codes or affordable housing requirements, that they fear will impair their autonomy and profitability.
Real estate companies could resist energy efficiency requirements at the
point of sale due to concerns about their impact on property transactions.
These interested parties deserve a voice in local government deliberations.
However, in comparison with the diffuse public interest in addressing climate change, the developers could end up having a disproportionate role in
decisionmaking.209 Ironically, contrary to the image of local democracies
as more receptive to citizen input, citizens may have more difficulty organizing their diffuse environmental interests into effective lobbying at the
local level than at the state or national level.210
While local municipalities represent the democratic will of their constituents, they do not, by definition, respond to the needs of those affected
by but excluded from the communities’ decisions.211 In particular, although many communities rely on workers who cannot find affordable
housing within the community, these workers do not have any influence on
the community’s exclusionary zoning practices. Moreover, if regional or
state-level decision-makers determine that municipalities should not prevent dense development, then that determination also represents the democratic will, a will expressed on a larger and more representative scale.212
More fundamentally, local governments, both urban and suburban, may
face political obstacles to adopting infill land use strategies that would integrate both cities and suburbs.213 As Professor Florence Wagman Roisman has stated bluntly: cities and suburbs “have separate governments in

208. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 57, 58, 62.
209. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 80-84 (describing the disproportionate role of transportation and real estate industries relative to diffuse citizen interests).
210. See id. at 90.
211. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 42; Briffault, supra note 167, at 1132-33; see also id.
at 70 (noting that those excluded from communities will be unable to have a voice in their
zoning regulations).
212. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 42 (“Notwithstanding an ostensible American predilection for participatory local governance, any geographic aggregation in a democratic system includes some dimension of the people’s will and excludes others.”).
213. Cf. id. at 82 (noting the “tough[] political fight [that] awaits those who attempt to
redress the NIMBYism and regulatory opposition that now face most infill projects”).
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large part because of a desire to have white and non-poor people live apart
from those who are poor and non-white.”214 She cautions that these racial
and economic divisions “cannot be cured without reducing or eliminating
the desire for separation and the policies that promote the separation.”215
As long as racial bias continues, middle and upper-income individuals may
be reluctant to move back to the cities or inner suburbs. Similarly, suburbs
may be unwilling to adopt zoning revisions that permit affordable housing
for lower-paid suburban workers seeking housing closer to their jobs.216
Middle and upper-class resistance to returning to the urban core is also a
reaction to the low quality of urban municipal services. Urban cores, as
well as some inner-suburbs, typically have poorer schools (both financially
and in terms of performance), deteriorating infrastructure, less open space,
and concerns about public safety.217 In light of the deterioration of services
within poor urban centers, there may be little market for upscale housing
within denser urban boundaries,218 and little reason for local or regional
governments to expect infill land use policies to succeed.219
Infill policies also face resistance from residents within the urban center.
Remembering the legacy of earlier urban renewal efforts that ousted poor
residents for the benefit of middle and upper-income residents, existing inner-city residents fear that infill developments could lead to gentrification
that displaces poor residents who have few options due to shortages of affordable housing and the persistence of housing discrimination.220 Poor
residents in urban cores could also resent efforts to promote housing for al-

214. Roisman, supra note 105, at 110; see also Buzbee, supra note 53, at 64-65 (observing that increasing suburbanization partly resulted from “white flight” from urban centers).
215. Roisman, supra note 105, at 111.
216. Cf. Salsich, supra note 207, at 473 (citing Professor William Fischel’s observation
that “local zoning has a systematic bias toward low-density residential uses in part because
of a desire to keep new housing for low-income households out of the community.”).
217. See Roisman, supra note 105, at 102 (describing white perceptions of urban centers); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 34; cf. Buzbee, supra note 53, at 67-70 (suggesting that residents have left central cities due to concerns regarding infrastructure, education, and crime
and discussing sprawl’s impact on central cities).
218. See Ziegler, supra note 16, at 43.
219. There has been some “back-to-the-city” movement in recent years, but the levels
remain quite modest. See Roisman, supra note 105, at 113.
220. See john a. powell, Race, Poverty, and Urban Sprawl: Access to Opportunities
through Regional Strategies, in GROWING SMARTER: ACHIEVING LIVABLE COMMUNITIES,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND REGIONAL EQUITY 51, 61, 65 (Robert D. Bullard, ed., 2007).
Inner-city residents may fear that the city of the future concentrates the wealthy in the
newly-desirable inner-city, and relegates the poor to fringe suburbs where they are isolated
by high transportation costs. Professor powell has noted that, in richer cities with few lowincome census tracts, new development does appear to have displaced the poor into more
remote suburbs. See id.
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ready-privileged middle and upper-income residents.221 Finally, changing
the racial and income structure of a city could dilute the power and cultural
identity established by the city’s existing residents.222
In this uncomfortable political, economic, and social reality, local governments may well resist calls for zoning reform. Parochial economic interests, the realities of power politics, and enduring racial tensions could all
undermine the prospects of what appear to be rational VMT-reducing land
use reforms.
C.

Federal and State Obstacles to Local Action

Federal and state policies have also created incentives for sprawl and
high VMT that, on their flip side, create disincentives for smart growth. As
noted above, state tax structures that require local governments to finance
local services have created a strong incentive for suburban governments to
engage in fiscal zoning that encourages development that will generate
high tax revenue but require few services.223 As a consequence, many suburbs court tax-generating commercial development but preclude affordable
housing, since low-cost housing generates relatively little in tax revenue
but leads to infrastructure costs like public schools. With little affordable
housing in the new suburban business centers, lower-paid workers face
long commutes.224
State and federal infrastructure financing also has a significant impact on
land use decisions.225 Professor Marilyn Brown observes that states receive highway funding from the Federal Highway Administration based, in
part, upon the taxes they contribute to the Highway Trust Fund, which is, in
turn, based upon each state’s vehicle use.226 Since efforts to cut vehicle use
would reduce transportation funding, the financing system creates a disincentive for state transportation officials to design a transportation infrastructure that would reduce vehicle use. More generally, state and federal
transportation financing decisions have a significant impact on sprawl,
221. See id. at 65. Powell responds to this concern by observing that, to address affordable housing needs, poor urban centers require the resources associated with mixed-income
housing. Id. at 66. Support for higher-income housing is, in this analysis, necessary to improve the well-being of the poor.
222. Cf. id. at 60 (explaining why inner-city communities have resisted regional government).
223. See Williams, supra note 144, at 82-85.
224. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 141 (describing impact of local tax policy on
affordable housing with consequent impacts on commute distances).
225. See Williams, supra note 144, at 84-87 (describing how highway decisions impact
future growth patterns).
226. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 34-35.
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since the creation of new highways can attract and enable sprawling
growth.227 Federal transportation bills also continue to provide significantly more funding for highways than for public transportation.228 Although some federal transportation and environmental programs have attempted to encourage greater coordination between transportation
financing, VMT, and land use planning, they have not fundamentally reformed the role of transportation infrastructure financing in increasing
sprawl.229
Federal tax policies have also indirectly impacted suburban sprawl and
consumption. Since federal bank guarantees and the federal mortgage deduction lower the effective cost of housing purchases, they have made larger homes more affordable and generated more demand for large suburban
single-family homes.230
Although cities have a central role to play in reducing demand and its
associated emissions, and although many cities have initiated their own
climate change initiatives, existing obstacles to local action will prevent
many cities from realizing their full potential to reduce consumer demand.

227. See Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 165-70.
228. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 35. The federal government provides up to
80% of the cost of new highways, and 90% of the cost for improvements and maintenance.
Id. Federal transit money, in contrast, is provided through a time-consuming competitive
process and, if provided, generally provides no more than 60% of the cost. Id. Local governments must often provide the remaining 40% or more for public transportation projects.
Id.
229. For example, recent federal transportation legislation, beginning with the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (“ISTEA”), has encouraged regional transportation planning organizations to consider land use implications, modes of transit in addition to cars, and the environmental implications of highway infrastructure. See Bartholomew, supra note 48. In addition, the federal Clean Air Act requires that transportation plans
and projects in areas that have not attained air quality standards must “conform” to the attainment plan established in the region and cannot lead to increases in VMT that would
worsen air quality. See Arnold W. Reitze, Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans - Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 292-97
(2004) (describing the Clean Air Act’s evolving conformity provisions). In this volume,
Professor Bartholomew describes how these programs have failed to provide a sufficient
brake on sprawl-inducing transportation investments and their limits as mechanisms for reforming local land use planning on a broad scale. See Bartholomew, supra note 48, at 191205 (describing transportation legislation’s limits, describing the Clean Air Act’s conformity analysis limitations, and summing up existing laws’ insufficiency).
230. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 37; John C. Dernbach & Scott Bernstein, Pursuing Sustainable Communities: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 35 URB. LAW. 496, 505
(2003); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 36 (noting the role of mortgage guarantees and deductions
in promoting new home purchases and enabling sprawl).
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V. VERTICAL INTEGRATION: LOCAL ACTION IN A FEDERAL, STATE,
AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
The obstacles described above suggest that federal or state requirements
will be necessary to promote local action. Ultimately, as a growing number
of scholars have recognized, effective federal climate change policy must
consider and integrate initiatives at the federal, state, regional, and local
level.231 At the same time, the advantages of local control argue for providing local governments with a significant (though not unbounded) degree
of autonomy in implementing federal or state requirements.
The land use and transportation context presents a particularly difficult
federalism challenge. Federal or state mandates will be essential to overcome local parochialism,232 but a local or regional role is simultaneously
essential on both a practical and political level. In the buildings context,
the federalism issues remain important, but are somewhat less delicate.
Minimum federal standards for residential and commercial buildings are
more feasible than federally dictated land use requirements since they are
less sensitive to local community values and needs. They could also provide an advantage to national developers by reducing the multiplicity of
standards that currently prevail. While the discussion below does not explicitly differentiate between the land use and buildings context, specific
provisions in federal legislation may well treat the two areas differently.
A.

Federal Legislation and State Implementation Planning

As this Article and others have proposed, federal climate change legislation should include a variant on the state implementation plan process currently included in the existing federal Clean Air Act.233 Under this verti231. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84; Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra
note 81; Osofsky, Climate Legislation in Context, supra note 167, at 247 (“Climate change
is a multiscalar problem that demands multiscalar solutions.”); Osofsky & Levit, The Scale
of Networks, supra note 183; Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (2008); Stewart, supra note 142, at
701 (noting that generic national measures “must be carefully linked with functionally related local regulatory programs . . . and institutional arrangements”); see also Buzbee, supra
note 53, at 103-07 (suggesting that a vertically integrated approach involving federal, state,
and local governments is necessary to address sprawl); Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note
230, at 509 (observing that sustainable communities cannot be achieved by local action
alone, but require supportive state and federal policies).
232. See Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities’
Sake, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 72 (1998) (noting that some scholars advocate a national
land use policy to overcome local decisions that fail to consider regional impacts).
233. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84; Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81; Peterson et al., supra note 231, at 264. Other federal laws impose state planning re-

KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL

2/20/2009 5:21:10 PM

2009] CLIMATE CHANGE, CONSUMPTION, AND CITIES

297

cally-integrated approach, federal legislation would establish federal requirements, parameters, and oversight while decentralizing those implementation decisions that are best executed at a state or local level.234 As a
first step, the legislation would require the EPA to identify the GHG emissions reductions to be achieved at the state or local level and then allocate
responsibility for achieving those reductions among the states.235 For exquirements and could provide a model for climate change legislation. For example, the
Coastal Zone Management Act supports state land use planning and gives states a variety of
options for engaging in such planning or delegating planning responsibilities to more local
jurisdictions. See Green, supra note 232, at 107-08 (describing statute’s planning approach).
234. Peterson et al., supra note 231, at 264. Since the federal government does not have
the constitutional authority to impose direct duties upon states and other subnational entities,
see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), federal legislation that imposed responsibilities on state and local governments would have to be carefully designed to avoid
constitutional limitations. As in the Clean Air Act, the federal government could condition
federal funding, like transportation funds, on performance of the legislation’s requirements,
or give states the option of having the federal government perform the required planning and
regulation instead. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 100-02 (discussing the impact of constitutional constraints on potential federal efforts to address sprawl); id. at 107-24 (describing the
possible use of conditional federal funding to control sprawl).
In the early 1970s, Congress considered but failed to adopt a federal land use law that
would have required states to engage in land use planning on their own or in cooperation
with local governments. See Green, supra note 232, at 117-18. The legislation recognized
the broad impact of local decisions and was intended to ensure that local governments did
not undermine regional well-being. Id.
235. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 823; Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 836; McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 7-8; Peterson et al., supra
note 231, at 260. Peterson, McKinstry, and Dernbach suggest that any reductions that
would not be achieved through national technology-based standards or a national cap-andtrade program should be allocated to the states and addressed through a state implementation planning process. Peterson et al., supra note 231, at 264.
The issue of how to allocate emission reduction responsibilities among the states, particularly in light of the significant disparities in emissions among the states, will present a significant challenge. The disparities do not necessarily represent differences in per capita usage, since some states generate energy (and emissions) on behalf of others. See Kaswan,
Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 836-37 (discussing issues likely to arise in determining each state’s reduction responsibility).
The European Union is planning on taking a similar approach for the third phase of its climate change program, slated to begin in 2013. Emissions amenable to control through a
European-wide cap-and-trade system, comprising approximately 45% of Europe’s emissions, will be handled through a centralized system. See LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (ETS) GETS READY FOR
KYOTO 1 (2007); COMM’N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE, AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 7 (2008), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LesUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0030:FIN:EN:PDF. Responsibility for the remaining emissions will be delegated to each nation within the European Union. Id. Each
nation state is then responsible for developing an emission reduction plan for the nontrading sector. Id.
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ample, reductions that could be achieved through VMT reductions or enhanced building standards could be assigned to the states.236 Relevant aspects of the state implementation process could then be further devolved to
the regional or local metropolitan level, which could develop demandreduction and other emission-reducing policies over sources within their
control.237 The state would then consolidate planned state, regional, and
local efforts into a state implementation plan subject to federal oversight.238
Below, I highlight a few of the many institutional issues that implementing a SIP-like process would raise: (1) the division of responsibility between states and more local levels; (2) devolution to regional agencies versus local governments; and (3) the extent to which certain types of land use
or buildings measures should be mandated or left to state and local discretion.
B.

The Division of Responsibility Between the State and Local Level

The states must first set the ground rules for regional or local land use
and building reforms. For example, they could establish parameters for the
types of zoning that are likely to reduce VMT and limit local discretion to

It is possible that determining each state’s obligation would be so deeply contested as to
paralyze the process. Alternatively, federal legislation could focus on policies and measures
that each state is required to adopt, rather than setting state-specific emission-reduction targets.
236. Determining the reductions attributable to the national government and those attributable to the state and local level will present important challenges given the potential overlap among the categories. For example, a national policy could address reductions from the
nation’s utilities, with the expectation that national requirements would be met through a
combination of technology improvements, fuel-switching, investment in alternative fuels,
and utility-driven demand management strategies. Utilities’ emissions, however, will also
be impacted by state and local demand-reduction measures, like building standards. Thus,
conceivably, a national emissions goal for utilities should assume, and subtract, the emissions reductions to be achieved through state and local initiatives. See McKinstry et al., supra note 122, at 5. It is also possible that the full emission reduction targets could be allocated to the states, who would then incorporate into their implementation plans not only
their own efforts, but also federal programs contributing to their efforts. That approach
would be similar to the Clean Air Act, which requires states to meet the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, but assumes that progress toward the standards will be achieved
through both state controls and federal programs such as the federal requirements on stationary sources and automobiles.
237. In addition to demand-reduction policies, localities could reduce emissions from
municipal operations, including those from municipal buildings, vehicle fleets, and landfills,
and facilitate renewable energy sources. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 148, at 421.
238. Legislators may want to consider federal oversight models that are somewhat less
burdensome than the existing oversight over state implementation plans under the Clean Air
Act, which requires federal approval of every change.
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adopt sprawl-inducing ordinances and engage in exclusionary zoning.239
States could also indirectly impact the factors that lead municipalities to
zone for sprawl by providing local governments with greater resources to
finance essential services, such as schools, and by reducing local governments’ financial reliance on property taxes.240 States’ transportation policies could foster compact development and public transit to disfavor
sprawl. On the buildings front, states could adopt more stringent minimum
energy codes and provide financing for local energy efficiency efforts.
But statewide measures can go only so far. After adopting appropriate
reforms at the state level, the states should delegate specific emissionreduction responsibilities to each metropolitan region241 and allow individual regions and cities to adopt and implement the land use and buildings
policies necessary to meet the state-set targets. The state would then oversee and approve local implementation plans to ensure regional and local
compliance.242
Devolution from the state to the local level is appropriate in light of the
unique advantages of local control.243 As discussed above, municipal land
use patterns are key causes of GHG emissions, and local entities are well
positioned to address them in light of their existing land use authority, their
knowledge of local circumstances and opportunities, their ability to include
239. Professor Levine observes that commentators concerned about municipalities’ failure to engage in smart growth frequently focus only on regional regulation rather than addressing states limitations on municipalities’ ability to preclude dense development. LEVINE, supra note 32, at 43.
240. See id. at 74-75. If local governments were less dependent upon property taxes, they
could be more likely to allow denser development and more affordable housing.
241. Determining the appropriate emissions budget for each locality is likely to be as difficult as determining the appropriate emissions budget for each state. See SALON & SPERLING, supra note 203, at 5-6 (evaluating several options for determining local budgets).
To address the connection between land use, VMT, and GHG emissions, California recently
passed legislation that will require the California Air Resources Board to establish regional
emission reduction targets for transportation. S.B. 375 § 4, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65080(b)(2)(A) (West 2008)). Each region will be
required to develop a Sustainable Communities Strategy that outlines the development and
land use patterns it will use to achieve the required reductions. Id.
242. States have adopted similar approaches to address other local decisions with statewide implications. For example, California requires cities and counties to adopt general
plans that address their fair share of regional housing need. See DIV. OF HOUS. POL’Y DEV.,
CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., STATE HOUSING ELEMENT LAW, http://www.hcd.ca.
gov/hpd/hrc/plan/he/heoverview.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). The state identifies each
region’s share of the state’s housing need and allocates that share to a regional planning organization. The planning organization develops a plan that in turn allocates the regional
need to the region’s cities and counties. The California Department of Housing and Community Development ultimately reviews each local general plan. Id.
243. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1168 (arguing that key land use decisions should be
made at the regional rather than the state level).

KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL

300

2/20/2009 5:21:10 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVI

the participation of and be accountable to the citizens who will be affected
by any adopted measures, and the benefit of allowing a diversity of approaches that could be models (good and bad) for other jurisdictions to follow (or avoid).244 By distributing the duty to reduce emissions, a state
would also be more likely to distribute the co-benefits of GHG emission
reductions, such as reductions in air pollution.245 Moreover, as a political
matter, legislation to improve land use planning is unlikely to succeed if it
strips local governments of their historic powers.246 The practical challenges of tracking, coordinating, and guiding local action at the federal and
state levels are outweighed by the benefits that local control could offer.247
The critical issue of local governments’ political will to reform—and the
implications for the necessary balance between mandate and discretion—is
discussed below.
California recently adopted legislation that could provide a national
model. In order to encourage statewide reductions in VMT and increase
incentives for land use reforms, the legislation requires the California Air
Resources Board to set a statewide goal for reducing VMT-generated vehicular emissions and then set regional reduction targets that distribute responsibility to each of California’s municipal areas.248 Metropolitan Planning Organizations (“MPOs”) in each region, already tasked with
transportation planning responsibilities, will be required to develop a Sustainable Communities Strategy that outlines the regional development and
land use patterns that would achieve the required reductions.249 California’s law suggests the potential viability of state-delegated VMT-reduction
obligations.
In the buildings context, devolution from the state to local level may be
less imperative. As discussed above, building standards implicate fewer
local socioeconomic and political considerations than land use provisions,
and statewide consistency may have a greater value than in the land use
context. Nonetheless, even if a state chooses to enact strict statewide building standards, local governments could be given the option of meeting regional or local greenhouse reduction goals through enhanced local stan-

244. See generally Griffith, supra note 102, at 1030-31 (describing the benefits of local
implementation of smart growth initiatives in light of local expertise and accountability).
245. Kaswan, Environmental Justice, supra note 85, at 10302.
246. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 103-04 (observing that federalism norms favoring local power are a “political reality”).
247. See Stewart, supra note 142, at 701.
248. S.B. 375 § 4, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §
65080(b)(2)(A) (West 2008)).
249. Id.
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dards.250 Local governments required to meet local emission reduction
goals could appreciate the flexibility of choosing from an array of land use
and buildings strategies.
C.

Devolution to the Regional or Local Level?

A critical and controversial issue for any planning strategy is the relative
role of regional entities and local governments. At least with respect to the
land use and transportation components of a state’s emission reduction
strategy, a regional planning role appears imperative.251 Initial emissionreduction obligations could be delegated to regional entities, who could
work with local governments and citizens to engage in a regional land use
planning effort that sets regional goals and establishes a general blueprint
for channeling regional growth and meeting regional needs.252 California’s
SB 375 has taken this approach by requiring the implementing state agency
to assign transportation-emission reduction obligations and associated
planning responsibilities to regional MPOs, entities that already engage in
transportation planning.253
Regional planning would combat localities’ tendency to serve parochial
rather than regional interests and allow for a more rational approach to the
inevitable spillover effects of local decisions in interconnected regions.254
Particularly in the land use context, local decisions have regional impacts.255 One suburb’s decision to allow low-density sprawling develop250. Cf. CPUC PLAN, supra note 74, at 82 (stating that local governments could help
achieve energy efficiency by developing building codes that exceed the state’s already-strict
energy code). On the importance of not preempting stricter state and local standards, see
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation];
Kaswan, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 81, at 798-803.
251. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 102, at 1019 (arguing for a regional approach to
achieve smart growth).
252. This approach is similar to the “blueprint” planning process underway in the Sacramento region, see supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text, and to the planning process
for VMT reduction established by S.B. 375. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
253. See Darrel Steinberg, SB 375 Connects Land Use and AB 32 Implementation, PLAN.
REP.,
July
2007,
available
at
http://www.planningreport.com/tpr/?module=
displaystory&story_id=1257&edition_id=92&format=html.
254. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1132-33, 1164 (arguing that local government decisions have spillover impacts that local governments fail to consider); Buzbee, supra note 53,
at 91 (observing that, although local governments make land use choices, “sprawl arises out
of dynamics, causes, and effects that tend, at a minimum, to be regional”); Griffith, supra
note 102, at 1026-27 (describing regional nature of sprawl). See also Steinberg, supra note
253 (quoting the S.B. 375’s author’s statement that “we need to plan as a region, not just as
individual cities and counties” due to the regional nature of air quality, congestion, and climate change concerns).
255. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1133-36.
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ment creates congestion in neighboring communities while forcing new development ever farther from the metropolitan core. Suburban zoning decisions that preclude affordable housing force low-paid workers to commute
long distances to suburban employment centers. Fundamentally, given the
flow of residents between local communities as they travel between work,
home, and school, individual municipalities do not have control over the
overarching land use and transit patterns that impact VMT. In addition, a
regional approach could reduce competition between communities within a
region, lessening the race to the bottom and the fear of leakage that could
otherwise impede desirable local action. As a practical matter, public
transportation systems are likely to be more effective if developed on a
comprehensive regional basis than on a municipal basis.256 As note above,
California could provide a partial model for regional planning to reduce
VMT: the state recently enacted legislation that assigns VMT-reduction
targets to metropolitan regions and requires regional MPOs, already established for transportation planning purposes, to develop an overarching regional land use plan.257
While regional planning is necessary to address the regional consequences of local land use decisions, creating fair and effective regional
governance poses numerous challenges. At present, regional planning entities generally have little direct authority; cities retain primary control over
basic land use and transportation decisions.258 Unless regional entities are
given greater power, they risk expending significant resources in planning
efforts that could ultimately fail to be implemented by the local governments who have actual authority.259
Giving regional entities full land use power or creating regional governments is, however, highly controversial and is unlikely to be implemented
given the political opposition of local governments to ceding governing authority.260 Conceivably, however, climate change legislation could give
256. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1026.
257. See Steinberg, supra note 253; see also supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
258. See SALON & SPERLING, supra note 203, at 4.
259. In light of these concerns, Deborah Salon and Daniel Sperling have proposed allocating carbon emissions budgets to cities and giving each city the discretion to determine
how best to meet its budget. See id. at 4. In contrast, a regional planning effort in Sacramento, California appears to be successfully translating regional plans into local government
implementation actions. See Sacramento Region Blueprint, http://www.sacregionblueprint
.org/sacregionblueprint/home.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). Local governments in the
Sacramento context may have been inspired to participate by projections that, without the
regional controls, congestion and air quality would become even more severe than the adverse conditions already experienced. See Campoy, supra note 187, at A1.
260. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1149, 1165. The League of California Cities initially opposed S.B. 375 due to its impact on local control, see Steinberg, supra note 253, but

KASWAN_AUTHOR_APPROVAL

2/20/2009 5:21:10 PM

2009] CLIMATE CHANGE, CONSUMPTION, AND CITIES

303

general planning authority to a regional entity but then empower the regional entity to further assign emission-reduction obligations to the local
level.261 Local governments would then develop more refined city-specific
land use, buildings, and other strategies to meet their local targets. As discussed further below, regional governments should be given sufficient
mechanisms, whether incentives or penalties, to induce local governments
to follow the regionally-established land use, transportation, and buildings
parameters and to meet their local targets.262 Although this approach
would necessarily diminish local government prerogatives, such diminishment is necessary to achieve critical land use reforms.
As regional institutions become increasingly powerful, with increased
planning responsibilities and enhanced authority to induce local compliance, they must ensure democratic accountability through adequate representation of affected populations and vigorous public participation requirements.263 Regional entities have not always met these goals. For
example, in the transportation planning context, MPOs that give an equal
vote to each municipality, regardless of size, provide suburban interests
with a disproportionate role relative to the population and interests they
represent.264 The views of a large central city could be outweighed by the
ultimately endorsed the bill. See League of California Cities, Issues & Legislation,
http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?displaytype=11&story=27392&zone=locc&section=issue
s&sub_sec=issues_enviro&tert=issues_enviro_cominfo# (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
Scholars have vigorously debated the value and potential shape of regional institutions. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 167. A full exploration of the issue is beyond the
scope of this Article.
261. See generally Briffault, supra note 167, at 1165-66 (advocating for a regional approach to land use that would nonetheless honor the “subsidiarity” principle, in which decisions would be left to local governments wherever possible).
262. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 194 (describing incentives that regional entities could
use to induce local governments to permit compact development). S.B. 375 includes carrots
to induce local government compliance. The MPO’s transportation planning and funding
decisions must be consistent with the sustainable communities strategy (“SCS”), and so inconsistent transportation projects would not receive funding. In addition, development projects consistent with the SCS are entitled to streamlined environmental reviews. See Memorandum from Bill Higgins, Legislative Representative & Sr. Staff Attorney, to California
City Officials 12-13 (Sep. 19, 2008), available at http://cacities.org/resource_files/27223.
SB%20375%20Implementation%20Final%209-19-08(1.1).pdf. It remains to be seen, however, whether these carrots will be sufficient to induce local governments to engage in land
use planning that is consistent with the SCS. Stronger incentives, like conditioning additional sources of federal funding or state approvals on compliance with the SCS, may be
necessary.
263. Some regionalism advocates propose that regional entities be representative, elected,
bodies rather than agencies staffed by appointed officials. See Briffault, supra note 167, at
1166-67; Griffith, supra note 102, at 1031-34.
264. Pursuant to federal transportation statutes, MPOs in many urban regions engage in
comprehensive regional transit planning. See Thomas W. Sanchez & James F. Wolf, Envi-
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multiple representatives of many small suburban communities, even if the
city represents a much larger population than the suburban areas. Regional
institutions responsible for developing an emission reduction blueprint
must ensure that they adequately represent and are accountable to the affected populations, and not simply the affected local governments. As discussed further below, regional entities also need to incorporate broad public
participation provisions to ensure input, particularly from groups who have
historically been underrepresented in land use decision-making processes.265
D.

Mandates or Discretion?

The state implementation planning process under the Clean Air Act,
while certainly not unfettered, has left states with considerable discretion in
how to meet air quality standards, particularly with respect to land use control measures. Most states have not chosen to reduce emissions through
land use control efforts.266 That deficit is likely attributable to the myriad
economic, political, and social obstacles to local smart growth and other
green initiatives discussed above. If states and local governments are left
with full discretion, these obstacles are likely to continue to impede change.
Federal law should therefore mandate that states require local or regional
institutions to meet their emission reduction obligations through land use
and other demand reduction efforts.267 At the same time, imposing precon-

ronmental Justice and Transportation Equity: A Review of MPOs, in GROWING SMARTER,
supra note 220, at 249, 251. The MPOs generally include one representative of each local
government within the metropolitan area, giving more weight (in relation to population) to
suburban communities than to core cities. Id. at 255, 265. As a consequence, suburbs,
which are generally whiter and richer than core cities, have a greater voice in establishing
regional transportation plans than urban centers. See Robert D. Bullard, Smart Growth
Meets Environmental Justice, in GROWING SMARTER, supra note 220, at 35-36.
265. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 96-98; see infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text
(discussing importance of participation in regional decisionmaking entities).
266. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 829-30; see also EWING ET AL., supra
note 13, at 136 (observing that “land use and transportation demand management policies
generally have not played a significant role in meeting” local air pollution reduction goals).
In light of its extreme air pollution, San Joaquin County is one of the few areas in the country to have incorporated land use measures in its SIP. See Carolyn Whetzel, San Joaquin
Valley Air District Adopts Rules to Cut Pollution from Developers, Wineries, 36 ENV’T REP.
2653 (2005). Developers of large new projects must incorporate land use or building design
strategies to reduce emissions or pay mitigation fees that would be used to fund other air
pollution reduction activities. Id.
267. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 84, at 829; cf. Salkin, supra note 20, at 825
(suggesting that states may need to mandate intergovernmental cooperation in order to overcome “strong home rule cultures in many jurisdictions”). Professor William Buzbee insightfully analyzes the political issues raised by varying levels of mandate and discretion in
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ceived and inflexible requirements on regional and local governments
would eliminate all the advantages of local government knowledge, fail to
adjust to the significant differences among localities, eliminate the democratic advantages of local control, and deprive the nation of the opportunity
to explore a variety of approaches.268 It is also likely to create a strong political backlash.269 Without attempting to draw the line between mandate
and discretion, it is clear that some combination of the two will be necessary.
Mandates to eliminate sprawl-inducing zoning provisions and promote
more compact development may raise the specter of government run amok,
forcing unwanted change on individuals and interfering with the housing
market. While it is true that mandates would interfere with local governments’ exclusionary zoning, studies suggest that eliminating low-density
zoning requirements and allowing more compact development would better
serve consumer demand for more compact communities,270 demand that is
now frustrated by existing zoning restrictions.271 A survey of developers
has found that they believe there is a strong market for compact development and that local zoning limitations prevent them from building to their
desired density.272 From a regional perspective, then, “interfering” with
existing local land use laws may help overcome systemic barriers that have
poorly served much of the population.
VI. A COMPREHENSIVE SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAND USE
Just as no single level of government can, by itself, revolutionize urban
form, an exclusive focus on urban form will not succeed in addressing the
underlying causes of sprawl.273 The essential land use planning ahead cannot focus solely on mechanical increases in density and rolling out the next
federal programs designed to induce state and local action through conditional federal
spending. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 117-24.
268. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text (describing advantages of local control).
269. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 124 (observing that strict requirements that could result in sanctions are likely to be politically unpopular); Salkin, supra note 20, at 814 (noting
that “purely regulatory solutions to planning and development problems” generate “strong
opposition”); see also SALON & SPERLING, supra note 203, at 11 (observing that local governments should be provided with “carrots” rather than “sticks” so that they become partners rather than adversaries).
270. See EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 23-27.
271. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 51-53 (describing limits imposed by existing zoning).
272. Id. at 127-28 (describing developer interest in compact development and their perception that municipal regulations impede such development).
273. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 60 (arguing that sprawl cannot be successfully abated
without addressing its social, market, and legal causes).
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bus line: it must take into account the associated sociopolitical and cultural
dimensions of the challenge. An integrated planning process would recognize land use policy as social policy, and, to the extent possible, explicitly
incorporate and address demand-reduction policies’ socioeconomic implications and potential.274 Such an approach is necessary not only to ensure
the success of VMT reduction; climate change-driven land use reforms create an opportunity to address underlying inequities and dysfunctions in the
land use system.
The emerging regional equity movement provides a roadmap for comprehensive urban development that integrates environmental, economic,
and social parameters. The movement advocates reducing “disparities in
transportation, housing, economic opportunity, land use, infrastructure,
education, environmental justice, and health.”275 Similar goals have been
articulated as part of the “smart growth” movement,276 as well as in the sustainable development literature focused on sustainable communities.277
A.

The Importance of Socioeconomic Factors in Achieving VMT
Reductions

As noted above, current land use patterns are, in part, a consequence of
past and present discrimination. The legacy of separation cannot be overcome without addressing the underlying social and economic causes of the

274. Urban development legislation has attempted to encourage integrated planning, but
has often failed to achieve its goals. See Green, supra note 232, at 112-13 (describing, for
example, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970); see also Salsich, supra note
207, at 487-90 (discussing federal housing and community development laws that encouraged comprehensive equity-based land use planning as a precondition to receiving grant
money). Some communities have undertaken such integrated planning on their own. See
Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 503 (describing local sustainable development
planning initiatives that integrated a wide variety of socioeconomic, environmental, and participatory concerns).
275. See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, in GROWING SMARTER, supra note 220, at 1, 5;
see also ANGELA GLOVER BLACKWELL & SARAH TREUHAFT, REGIONAL EQUITY AND THE
QUEST FOR FULL INCLUSION 2 (2008), available at http://www.policylink.org/Events/
documents/FramingPaper08.pdf.
276. See Salkin, supra note 20, at 789-90 (listing the American Planning Association’s
description of smart growth, which incorporates environmental and economic factors, including the need for greater equity). Notwithstanding the American Planning Association’s
inclusive definition of smart growth, some have critiqued the movement for focusing primarily on environmental issues with little consideration of racial and social equity. See Bullard, supra note 275, at 3; see also Salkin, supra note 20, at 825 (stating that affordable
housing and “social equity must be a bigger part of the smart growth discussion”).
277. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 495-99.
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urban/suburban divide.278 Professor Roisman stresses the importance of
continuing efforts to address racial and economic bias.279
More concretely, sprawl is unlikely to be mitigated, and central cities
unlikely to be repopulated with middle- and upper-income residents, unless
urban services improve.280 For example, middle- and upper-income families are unlikely to move to the central city without profound improvements
in school quality.281 That raises a “chicken and egg” problem: without
wealthier residents and businesses, cities cannot afford to improve services,
but without the improved services, they cannot attract revenue-generating
residents and businesses. Federal, state, and regional strategies to promote
infill development to reduce emissions thus need to consider not only their
immediate objectives, but a broader socioeconomic agenda that addresses
the resources deficit in struggling urban centers.282
While improving urban services to encourage middle-class infill is critical, infill policies that simply displace poor residents would be counterproductive from both a social justice and VMT-reduction perspective. Infill
policies focused on adding new housing rather than replacing existing
housing are less likely to pose this risk.
Socioeconomic considerations are critical to the development path
within suburbs as well as cities. For example, to alleviate the long commutes of lower-paid workers in suburban settings, VMT-reduction strategies must address the lack of affordable housing in suburbs.283 Policies
that not only encourage greater infill and density, but also include affordability requirements, could enable low-wage workers to live closer to employment centers. In order to induce suburbs to give up exclusionary zoning, states will have to address the system of financing local services that
drives exclusionary fiscal zoning.284

278. See supra notes 203-22 and accompanying text.
279. See Roisman, supra note 105, at 112.
280. See id.
281. As Professor Bullard notes, school quality plays a central role in family locational
decisions. Bullard, supra note 264, at 33.
282. A full elaboration of possible strategies is beyond the scope of this Article. Measures could, however, include state or federal requirements that local jurisdictions share a
greater portion of their tax revenue for regional or statewide purposes. See Myron Orfield,
Building Regional Coalitions Between Cities and Suburbs, in GROWING SMARTER, supra
note 220, at 323, 325-31.
283. See Salsich, supra note 207, at 463-65 (observing that low-density single-use suburban zoning presents a significant obstacle to the provision of affordable housing); id. at 498
(noting that “the growing disparity between job opportunity and affordable housing availability is a matter of national concern”).
284. See supra notes 204-06, 239 and accompanying text.
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Beyond Demand Management: Achieving Regional Equity

Reducing VMT is not the only justification for incorporating regional
equity goals into climate change policy. Decisions to address emissions inevitably implicate a wide range of economic and social factors. Addressing
only one facet of a multi-faceted venture is simply poor decisionmaking.
For example, in the land use context, increased VMT is only one of
sprawl’s many adverse consequences.285 A holistic recognition of land use
regulation’s impacts could lead to more productive and effective reforms.286 Climate change policies promoting land use reform could thus
provide a vehicle for creating more effective and more equitable urban infrastructures that enhance municipal services, increase opportunities for the
disadvantaged, and improve quality of life.287 Since these goals are consistent with, and in some cases necessary to, the success of demand-reduction
measures, the opportunity is one to be taken.
While this is not the place to fully explore and defend the concept of regional equity as an important component of land use policy, I note that
scholars are increasingly recognizing that greater equity would benefit not
only the urban underclass, but entire metropolitan regions.288 Contrary to
the assumptions of some suburbanites that they have insulated themselves
from the problems of the urban core, recent studies have shown that the
economic, social, and environmental health of the suburbs often track the
core’s well-being.289 The pursuit of regional equity is thus justified not
only in redistributive terms, but as a mechanism for enhancing entire metropolitan regions, both core and suburb.

285. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 53, at 69-75 (describing sprawl’s adverse consequences); Ziegler, supra note 16, at 37-45 (same).
286. While some argue that the imperatives of climate change demand an exclusive focus
on measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, I argue that climate change policies can
and should address a broader agenda. See Kaswan, Environmental Justice, supra note 85, at
10287-88. The regional equity movement calls for considering the equity impacts at the
“front end” of political processes and ensuring “that disadvantaged communities participate
in and benefit from decision that determine the course of development in their neighborhoods, communities, and regions.” BLACKWELL & TREUHAFT, supra note 275, at 2.
287. In addition, to the extent that policymakers question the wisdom of encouraging
compact growth as a climate change strategy due to uncertainties as to its effectiveness in
reducing VMT, see supra notes 42-66 and accompanying text, considerations like creating
affordable housing near job centers and improving quality of life provide additional justifications for reforming land use policy. See LEVINE, supra note 32, at 47-48, 185-86.
288. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 53, at 131 (arguing that all localities in a region ultimately recognize the value of a municipal region that offers essential services).
289. See Briffault, supra note 167, at 1137-40; Roisman, supra note 105, at 90-96; powell, supra note 220, at 54.
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An integrated approach is desirable from a practical as well as a theoretical perspective. While integrated planning may appear more complicated than single-issue planning, planning officials may find an integrated
approach more, not less, efficient than a multiplicity of separately mandated, yet intrinsically interconnected planning exercises. Emission reduction plans impacting urban form require decisions about the location of
housing, workplaces, and infrastructure, decisions that are fundamentally
interrelated. Developing separate plans could lead to disjointed and inefficient results.290
Regional equity goals can be integrated into land use planning efforts
through a wide variety of mechanisms that both reduce environmental impacts and address social equity considerations.291 Green building programs
could also integrate regional equity goals by channeling employment opportunities to communities in need. For example, they could develop green
jobs programs that train unemployed residents to engage in energy efficiency retrofits and weatherization.292
C.

Meaningful Participation

A top-down requirement that relevant officials consider the full array of
socioeconomic implications of land use and other climate policies is
unlikely to be effective.293 A key attribute of local planning is its ability to
include the participation of community members in planning efforts.294
That participation risks, however, simply replicating the existing power
structures within metropolitan areas.295 Federal or state legislation designed to encourage smart growth measures should therefore include par-

290. The League of California Cities lauded S.B. 375’s integration of land use, transportation, and housing planning, noting that it helped overcome the “long-standing issue” of
“single-purpose state agencies.” See Memorandum from Bill Higgins, supra note 262, at 3.
291. Blackwell and Treuhaft suggest such strategies as transit-oriented development, inclusionary zoning, and incentives to coordinate employment and affordable worker housing.
See BLACKWELL & TREUHAFT, supra note 2755, at 3.
292. See id. at 7 (arguing that the “growing green economy” should be linked “to the renewal of low-income communities”); see also Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate
Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56
BUFF. L. REV. 169, 223-27 (discussing potential for green-collar jobs); Kaswan, Environmental Justice, supra note 85, at 10311 (discussing the potential for domestic climate
change policies to channel green development opportunities to disadvantaged communities).
293. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 500.
294. See id. at 509 (describing importance of public participation).
295. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 135.
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ticipation requirements that will ensure sufficient representation of traditionally underprivileged groups in planning efforts.296
The issue of devolving authority to regional versus local entities must
also grapple with the socioeconomic implications of that choice. Vesting
authority in local entities could undermine change if suburban exclusionary
impulses continue to govern and smart growth and affordable housing incentives are insufficient to overcome them. A regional focus could have
more potential to incorporate the interests of an entire region, including the
urban core. However, regional decision-making processes risk being
overly insulated from public participation and control,297 or, alternatively,
unequally representing the communities over which they have jurisdiction.
Past regional transportation planning efforts have given suburban interests
a proportionately greater voice.298 Regional planning efforts must therefore
ensure sufficient participation to be responsive to the public, and be designed to elicit the meaningful participation of groups that have historically
been underrepresented in decision-making fora.299
Achieving integrated planning thus requires climate change policymakers developing VMT reduction or green building strategies to consider not
only the mechanics of changing urban form, but broader considerations including affordable housing, municipal services, transit equity, and meaningful participatory structures. The broader the goals, the broader the necessary expertise, the broader the potentially affected constituencies, and the

296. As Professor Bullard has stated, “if poor people and people of color are not at the
table when plans are developed or decisions are made, their interests may not be well
served.” Bullard, supra note 2644, at 25. They therefore need a seat at the table, and they
“must be heard and respected, and their vision must be acted on before real change takes
hold.” Id. at 25; see also BLACKWELL & TREUHAFT, supra note 2755, at 9 (emphasizing the
importance of meaningful participation in decisionmaking).
297. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 134 (stating that “[i]f democratically unaccountable
regional authorities become the main venue for review of regional decisions influencing
sprawl, the public’s voice is particularly likely to go unheard”).
298. In the transportation planning context, certain regional planning efforts have been
plagued with concerns about the adequacy of community representation. Pursuant to federal
transportation statutes, MPOs in many urban regions engage in comprehensive regional
transit planning. See Sanchez & Wolf, supra note 264, at 251. The MPOs generally include
one representative of each local government within the metropolitan area, giving more
weight (in relation to population) to suburban communities than to core cities. Id. at 255,
265. As a consequence, suburbs, which are generally whiter and richer than core cities,
have a greater voice in establishing regional transportation plans than urban centers. See
Bullard, supra note 2654, at 35-36; see also supra notes 264-2655 and accompanying text.
299. Ironically, such expectations could make regional approaches less politically viable.
Those in power in particular local jurisdictions tend to resist new governance forms that
could jeopardize that power. See Griffith, supra note 102, at 1043 (noting that, in light of
Atlanta’s racial politics and segregated structure, existing municipalities are unwilling to
“cede power” to a regional government entity).
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greater the potential for conflicts and tensions. Unless there is sufficient
local political pressure, state and local governments considering land use
and other institutional changes may fail to incorporate regional equity goals
in land use plans designed to reduce VMT.300 To achieve regional equity—or any other non-emission related goals—federal or state laws designed to reduce VMT will need to include specific parameters that require
local or state planning efforts to incorporate equity considerations.301
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, if federal climate change legislation continues to focus primarily on smokestacks and tailpipes it will fail to address the underlying
cause of most emissions: consumption. While federally-proposed marketbased mechanisms could indirectly induce some reductions in consumption, the market is an imperfect tool for stimulating the necessary changes
in the built environment. To address consumption, the nation needs to directly address its land use and buildings policies.
Cities can play a vital role in that process. But notwithstanding the tremendous surge in local climate change activity, with smart growth initiatives and green building ordinances abounding, reliance on piecemeal urban initiative is unlikely to be sufficient. Federal climate legislation should
create a vertically integrated framework for requiring states to take responsibility for reducing statewide consumption and, as appropriate, delegating
that responsibility to the regional or local level. In light of the complexity
of the political, economic, and social factors lying behind land use policy,
federal legislation must also, to the extent possible, attend to the socioeconomic preconditions for successful land use reform. Finally, climate
change legislation has its silver lining: by re-opening fundamental institutions, like urban structure, it provides an opportunity to integrate a regional
equity approach that would not only reduce VMT, but redress the deeper
ills that our sprawling legacy has produced.
A single federal climate change bill is unlikely to incorporate all of the
elements necessary to reform land use and building practices. Rather, fed300. Given power imbalances in some regions, it is quite conceivable that the poor and
disadvantaged who would most benefit from regional equity principles would be the least
politically powerful, and the least able to incorporate such goals in planning efforts.
301. Local and regional institutions could work with and draw upon the civic organizations attempting to integrate environmental, social justice, and sustainability concerns. Such
organizations include, for example, the Apollo Alliance, a coalition of business, labor, and
environmental groups promoting green jobs, and Policy Link, a national institute advancing
economic and social equity. See generally Apollo Alliance, http://apolloalliance.org/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009); Welcome to PolicyLink, http://www.policylink.org (last visited Jan.
23, 2009).
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eral and state laws addressing transportation,302 tax structures,303 community development,304 schools, affordable housing, and appliance and building energy standards305 may all play a role in encouraging the proposed
land use and building changes. Moreover, state laws governing utilities,306
land-use planning,307 and the relative power of regional versus local governments are critical.308 Notwithstanding the complexity of these component parts, federal climate change legislation that recognizes the critical
role of consumption—and the importance of redirecting land use and building policies to reduce consumption—would set the nation on a more realistic course toward achieving its climate change goals.

302. For example, the federal government’s transportation programs could re-orient
transportation funding from highways to transit, see BROWN ET AL., supra note 11, at 48-49,
include performance standards and incentives to reduce VMT, and set standards for localities to qualify for federal transportation funding. See Bartholomew, supra note 48; Buzbee,
supra note 53, at 125-26; see also EWING ET AL., supra note 13, at 130-36.
303. Tax policies could create tax credits or deductions for energy efficiency improvements. See Dernbach, supra note 2, at 10018-19. As discussed above, states could consider
more equitable financing of local services to reduce the incentives to engage in exclusionary
zoning. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
304. On the community development front, the National League of Cities has proposed
federal community block grants to further energy efficiency and smart growth efforts in disadvantaged communities that are unlikely to have sufficient capital. National League of Cities, Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant, http://www.nlc.org (search “energy
efficiency and conservation block grant”) (last visited Jan 23, 2009).
305. Such efforts would include not only the standards themselves, but mechanisms to
facilitate consumer access to information about appliance and building energy use, information that would enhance the efficacy of market-based approaches. See Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior, supra note 10, at 147-49
306. Utilities would have a greater incentive to invest in demand-management programs
if utility profits were decoupled from energy generation, see supra note 114 and accompanying text, if alternative rate structures were designed to encourage conservation, and if
utilities were permitted to invest directly in energy efficiency measures, especially for poor
residents, rather than investing in power plants.
307. States whose land use laws preclude smart growth zoning could revise state law to
allow or encourage sprawl-constraining land use reforms. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra
note 230, at 520 (suggesting reform); id. at 511 (noting that some states’ zoning laws require
local governments to engage in single-use zoning). Many, but not all, states have already
adopted such reforms. See id. at 511-12; see also Salkin, supra note 20, at 790-821 (describing state smart growth programs); id. at 835-36 (describing potential state measures to
encourage local smart growth).
308. See Dernbach & Bernstein, supra note 230, at 520; see also EWING ET AL., supra
note 13, at 141-42.

